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SIMILARITY OR DIFFERENCE AS A 
BASIS FOR JUSTICE: MUST ANIMALS BE 
LIKE HUMANS TO BE LEGALLY 
PROTECTED FROM HUMANS? 
TAIMIE L. BRYANT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 6, 1960, Jane Goodall observed two chimpanzees stripping 
the leaves off of twigs, inserting them into termite mounds, and eating the 
termites they extracted.1 In reply to Goodall’s telegram carrying this news, 
Louis Leakey responded: “Now we must redefine tool, redefine Man, or accept 
chimpanzees as humans.”2 By stating that one of our choices is “accepting 
chimpanzees as humans,” rather than simply “redefining chimpanzees” 
(without reference to humans), Leakey suggests that dramatic consequences 
could flow from finding similarities between chimpanzees and humans. If 
chimpanzees are accepted as humans and if justice requires that like entities be 
treated alike, justice would require legal protection of chimpanzees from 
exploitation to which chimpanzees—but not humans—are subject. This has 
been the argument and goal of The Great Ape Project.3 Indeed, it is the 
argument and goal of much of animal advocacy. 
If humans are defined in some significant measure by a particular 
characteristic (such as toolmaking ability, self-awareness, or the capacity to 
suffer), questions of justice arise when animals are sufficiently similar to 
humans as to that characteristic and justice is defined as requiring that like 
entities be treated alike.  In the context of that definition of justice, finding that 
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 1. JANE GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF THE GOMBE: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 535 (1986). 
Goodall describes other types of toolmaking and tool usage. Id. at 535–42. 
 2. Jane Goodall, Learning from the Chimpanzees: A Message Humans Can Understand, 282 SCI. 
2184, 2184–85 (1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/282/5397/2184. 
 3. See generally THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & 
Peter Singer eds., 1993) [hereinafter THE GREAT APE PROJECT]. 
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animals are similar to humans as to one or more essential characteristics has 
greater significance than mere satisfaction of intellectual curiosity about 
animals. It calls into question the morality of such human practices as sport 
hunting and fishing, flesh-food production methods, and the consumption of 
flesh foods. The argument is, if justice requires that like entities be treated 
alike, it cannot be just to hunt or consume animals (who are like humans), 
because humans (who are like animals) are not subject to being hunted or 
turned into food products. Justice may not require that animals be exactly the 
same as humans (for instance, the number of toes and the presence of fur may 
not be relevant) or that they have rights exactly coterminous with the rights of 
humans, but justice would require that animals receive protection in ways that 
match up with those similarities they share with humans that are characteristics 
considered essential to our understanding of what it means to be human. Stated 
generally, the argument is that if animals are similar to humans as to capacities 
and characteristics of humans that define humans, then animals should receive 
protections equivalent to the protections of humans because a just society treats 
like entities alike.  I refer to this as “the similarity argument.” 
The similarity argument—that justice requires the like treatment of like 
entities—drove the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, and the 
disability rights movement.4 Not surprisingly, then, the similarity argument also 
dominates advocacy for animals.5 This is so regardless of whether the goal is 
animal rights or the more humane use of animals. Although advocates may rest 
their claim on animals’ cognitive capacity, on animals’ capacity to suffer, or on 
some combination of the two,6 the argument is the same: justice requires that 
 
 4. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989) (documenting the desire to belong as motivating “outsiders” and their 
utilization of constitutional law to secure equal, albeit often only formally equal, treatment in American 
society); WILLIAM M. NEWMAN, AMERICAN PLURALISM: A STUDY OF MINORITY GROUPS AND 
SOCIAL THEORY 59 (1973) (describing assimilation by immigrant groups, when “[t]he central tenet . . . 
was that new groups must conform to the cultural tradition of the majority or dominant group”); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 419, 465, 475 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements 
on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2071, 2072 (2002); Nancy 
Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality and Antisubordination Strategies in Gay 
Legal Theory, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 919–21 (2000) (discussing shared-humanity theory as a means of 
addressing the dangers of theories of sameness and “homogenizing” strategies associated with the 
similarity argument); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 
1287–91 (1987). 
 5. Philosopher Christoph Anstötz discusses the history of the idea of equality as “a story of the 
development of the moral requirement to give up unjustified forms of discrimination.”  He traces it 
through various movements and into the context of the animal protection movement. Christoph 
Anstötz, Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great Apes: A Comparision, in THE 
GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 3, at 158–60. 
 6. Scholars focused on justifications for entitlements in animals to better treatment by humans 
have traditionally focused on cognition, or sentience, or both. See TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR 
ANIMAL RIGHTS (3d ed. 2004) (arguing in support of rights for animals with sufficient consciousness to 
have desires, plans, and a sense of the future: in other words, animals who are “subjects-of-a-life”); 
RICHARD D. RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION: CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS SPECIESISM (Berg 
2000) (1989) (emphasizing sentience as the primary factor that justifies animal rights); PETER SINGER, 
ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975) (arguing for the consideration of animal interests in avoiding suffering); 
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animals be protected from human (ab)use because animals are similar enough 
to humans to be given protections similar to those that humans have from each 
other.7 
The animal rights perspective calls for freedom from any and all 
exploitation by humans, and, as most rigorously developed in the legal context 
by law scholar Gary L. Francione, that perspective identifies animals’ legal 
status as private property as the legal basis for humans’ exploitation of animals.8 
Unlike advocates for more humane treatment of animals who do not challenge 
the legal property status of animals, rights advocates challenge the legal status 
of animals as property in order to eliminate human use of animals, whether or 
not such use is considered to be humane.9 Despite that ideological difference, 
both humane-treatment claims and rights claims currently rest largely on the 
similarity argument. Since, for the purposes of this article, there is little need to 
distinguish between proponents of humane treatment and proponents of animal 
 
STEVEN WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000) (adopting the 
view that as science confirms the cognitive capacities and consciousness of animals, animals should be 
accorded rights to be free from exploitation); Gary Francione, Our Hypocrisy, NEW SCIENTIST, June 4, 
2005, at 51–52 (stating that the most important characteristic of a nonhuman animal for purposes of 
rights entitlement is sentience and rejecting a “like-mind” basis of entitlement); see also Anstötz, supra 
note 5, at 168–70, 158–72; Brigid Brophy, The Rights of Animals, in POLITICAL THEORY AND ANIMAL 
RIGHTS 156, 159 (Paul A.B. Clarke & Andrew Linzey eds., 1990); Heta Häyry & Matti Häyry, Who’s 
Like Us, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 3, at 173–76, 173–82; James Rachels, Why 
Darwinists Should Support Equal Treatment for Other Apes,  in THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 
3, at 155, 152–57; SINGER, supra, at 163, 162–67. 
 7. In his overview of the field of animal rights, Clifford J. Sherry writes of Tom Regan and Peter 
Singer, as leaders in the field, that both are drawn to analytical ethics, in which a central tenet is 
universality, “which means that any ethical prescription is applicable to everyone in relatively similar 
circumstances. If a duty can be extended to more people or situations, then analytical ethics demands 
that it must be extended. Further, if different moral judgments are made in two different cases, 
analytical ethics demands that one must demonstrate a morally relevant difference between the cases.” 
CLIFFORD J. SHERRY, ANIMAL RIGHTS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 4 (1994); see also Stephen M. 
Wise, Animal Rights One Step at a Time, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS 19 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter ANIMAL RIGHTS] 
(“Equality demands that likes be treated alike.  Equality rights therefore depend upon how one 
rightless animal compares to another with rights.” Id. at 30); REGAN, supra note 6, at 248 (“If 
individuals have equal inherent value, then any principle that declares what treatment is due them as a 
matter of justice must take their equal value into account.”). These positions are taken largely in 
opposition to the perspective that species membership determines just treatment. Richard Ryder, who 
coined the term “speciesism,” wrote in surveying the field of animal rights, or animal welfare, that 
“[o]ur moral argument is that species alone is not a valid criterion for cruel discrimination. . . . Where it 
is wrong to inflict pain upon a human animal it is probably wrong to do so to a nonhuman sentient. The 
actual killing of a nonhuman animal may also be wrong if it causes suffering or, more contentiously, if it 
deprives the nonhuman of future pleasures. The logic is very simple.”  RYDER, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 8. This is a central thesis of GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995). 
See also Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, The Great Ape Project—and Beyond, in THE GREAT APE 
PROJECT, supra note 3, at 304; Gary L. Francione, Personhood, Property and Legal Competence, in 
THE GREAT APE PROJECT supra note 3, at 248. 
 9. According to Francione, the failure to attack the underlying legal problem of the legal status of 
animals as property will further delay improvements for animals. GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN 
WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996). An alternative 
approach is suggested by David Favre. David Favre, A New Property Status for Animals: Equitable Self-
Ownership, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 234–50 (advocating treating animals legally as a kind 
of property with legally cognizable interests). 
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rights, both groups are referred to as “animals’ advocates.”  Similarly, the term 
animal “(ab)use” is used to capture the perspectives of both those who think 
that only abuse in the use of animals need be addressed and those who think 
that all uses of animals constitute abuse and exploitation. 
Part II discusses several problems with the similarity argument in the 
particular context of advocacy for animals. As a theory of justice for animals, 
the similarity argument makes the fact of diversity of nonhuman life irrelevant 
or actually harmful to animals because it undercuts the justification for 
protecting them—that they are like humans. Also, the similarity argument 
promotes pernicious hierarchical ordering of nonhuman animals based on their 
relative proximity to humans. As a pragmatic matter, it is extremely difficult to 
prove to the satisfaction of opponents that nonhuman animals are sufficiently 
like human animals that justice requires curtailing the rights that humans 
currently have in nonhuman animals. As in the case of chimpanzees’ making 
tools, proof of animals’ similarity to humans could as easily (if not more easily) 
result in redefining what it means to be human as it could result in redefining 
animals as part of the human community. 
Part III considers two examples of other social justice movements that first 
used the similarity argument but later adopted a different ideological pathway 
to justice. That pathway is referred to as “the anti-discrimination approach” 
because it is based on the idea that a just society would prevent harm or 
exclusion that is based on superficial or irrelevant differences among people. 
Such a society would protect and amplify the values of diversity and inclusion. 
Borrowing to some extent from the precautionary principle, which developed in 
the context of environmental protection, the anti-discrimination stance requires 
restraint on the part of those who can, by virtue of their power to exclude or 
control others, cause harm to others, and it requires that those individuals or 
entities bear the burden of justifying exclusion or harm to the interests of 
others. As examples of the emergence of the anti-discrimination approach, Part 
III examines feminist advocacy for family and medical leave provisions and 
disability rights advocacy for greater accessibility to commercial and residential 
buildings. 
Part IV discusses two examples of an anti-discrimination approach as 
applied to animal protection: the Endangered Species Act and the development 
of artificial wildlife corridors. Neither is an ideal example of the anti-
discrimination approach. Nevertheless, each does reveal some aspects of the 
anti-discrimination approach and its advantages over the similarity argument. 
Those advantages include promoting respect for the diversity of animals, rather 
than having to prove their similarity to humans, shifting attention from animals’ 
worthiness (or not) to be free from exploitation to supposed or proffered 
justifications for exploitation, and emphasizing advocacy to create an animal-
respecting society without first having to prove that animals are like humans. In 
its most rigorous forms, the anti-discrimination approach leads to precautionary 
protection of animals without first waiting for harms to occur and subsequently 
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seeking to correct those harms; it requires anticipatory accommodation of 
animal interests. 
II 
PROBLEMS WITH THE SIMILARITY ARGUMENT 
The similarity argument, in the context of advocacy for animals, claims that 
animals are like humans in the capacities that are relevant to legal entitlements 
and, therefore, that a just society would provide species-appropriate legal 
entitlements that mirror the entitlements society gives humans. A fundamental 
problem with this argument is that it is not possible to resolve completely the 
question whether some or all animals are sufficiently like humans that justice 
requires treating the two groups alike, even if there were agreement about 
which capacities are relevant for comparison.10 Information about animals’ 
capacities, independent of comparisons to human capacities, is useful 
information about animals and may change public attitudes about animals. 
Nevertheless, if the basis of the claim for increased protection is that like 
entities (humans and animals) should be treated alike (both should have 
entitlements to protect themselves), information about animals simply as 
animals (and not as compared to humans) is not useful for the purpose of giving 
animals increased protection and reducing the rights of humans to (ab)use 
them. If animals do not have characteristics considered essential to humans in 
the ways that those characteristics exist in humans, it is possible to dismiss claims 
of similarity raised for purposes of curtailing humans’ use of animals. Even if 
one is seeking only better treatment for animals and not legal rights, the 
argument of similarity to humans is weakened by counterarguments that 
animals are not similar enough to create an obligation in humans to treat them 
better. For example, animals may feel pain but cognitively process it differently 
or manage it more effectively.11 Animals may think, but not in the ways that 
 
 10. In fact, there is disagreement about which capacities are relevant. See John Rawls, Outside the 
Scope of the Theory of Justice, in POLITICAL THEORY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS, 154, 155 (Paul A.B. 
Clarke & Andrew Linzey eds., 1990) (contending that since animals lack a moral sense they are not 
owed the duties of justice). In some cases the disagreement is about what type of cognitive or sentient 
capacities animals share with humans that would justify the similarity argument. For example, 
Raymond Frey has argued that animals lack complex language, which indicates deficiencies in cognitive 
capacity as compared to humans. RAYMOND FREY, INTERESTS AND RIGHTS: THE CASE AGAINST 
ANIMALS (1980); see also STEPHEN WALKER, ANIMAL LEARNING: AN INTRODUCTION (1987). The 
idea that animals do not have language has been reconsidered on the basis of research since the time of 
these publications. See, e.g., DONALD H. OWINGS & EUGENE S. MORTON, ANIMAL VOCAL 
COMMUNICATION: A NEW APPROACH (1998) (arguing that animals use verbal communication in 
order to cause others to do what they want them to do); EUGENE S. MORTON & JAKE PAGE, ANIMAL 
TALK: SCIENCE AND THE VOICES OF NATURE (1992).  However, the debate continues.  See, e.g., 
DANIEL C. DENNETT, KINDS OF MINDS: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1996). 
 11. See, e.g., TEMPLE GRANDIN, ANIMALS IN TRANSLATION 187 (2005) (“I think injured animals 
are probably somewhere in between a leucotomy patient and a normal human being.  They do feel 
pain, sometimes intense pain, because their frontal lobes haven’t been surgically separated from the 
rest of their brains.  But they probably aren’t as upset about pain as a human being would be in the 
same situation, because their frontal lobes aren’t as big or all-powerful as a human’s . . . . I think it’s 
possible that animals may have as much pain as people do, but less suffering.”); see also SHERRY, supra 
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humans do. If an animal lacks self-consciousness or the cognitive ability to 
anticipate his life in the future, the loss of his life may be deemed less 
meaningful than the loss of a human’s life because humans do have self-
consciousness and can project themselves into the future.12 Moreover, new 
information that appears to prove similarity between humans and animals may 
only result in a redefinition of the term “human” so that the oppositional 
categories of “human” and “animal” remain intact.  Just as the finding that 
chimpanzees make tools meant that humans would no longer be defined by 
reference to toolmaking, newfound similarities between animals and humans 
may result only in new or refined definitions of humans, in order to retain the 
singularity of humans. 
A. Problems of Proof and Acceptance of Proof 
Given what is at stake if justice requires that like entities be treated alike, it 
is not surprising that it is difficult to prove or to gain acceptance of even basic 
similarities of animals with humans. As many as thirty-five years before 
Goodall’s observation of chimpanzees making tools in the wild, Wolfgang 
Köhler documented the ability of captive chimpanzees to figure out how to 
stack boxes and to make poles long enough to obtain bananas placed out of 
reach.13 He could not document what was going on in their minds,14 however, 
 
note 7, at 32, 38; Bob Bermond, The Myth of Animal Suffering, in THE ANIMAL ETHICS READER  79 
(Susan J. Armstrong & Richard G. Botzler eds., 2003). 
 12. For example, even a strong advocate for animals, philosopher Tom Regan, has conceded that if 
four humans and one dog of equal weight occupy a lifeboat that can safely accommodate only four, the 
dog should be sacrificed because the dog, unlike the humans, does not live in anticipation of the future 
or understand what his loss will be. It doesn’t help the dog that he can think; the dog has to think like a 
human in order to be saved. See REGAN, supra note 6, at 324–25. According to Gary Francione, 
Regan’s example of the lifeboat seems to be at odds with Regan’s underlying theory of animal rights. 
Francione points out that there is a basic problem in using for conflict resolution among existing rights-
holders a theory whose purpose is to establish the basic rights not to be exploited and killed at 
someone’s whim. Gary Francione, Comparable Harm and Equal Inherent Worth: The Problem of Dog 
in the Lifeboat, 11 BETWEEN THE SPECIES 86, 86–88 (1995). My point here, though, is to acknowledge 
how easy it is to concede that since animals may not think like humans in all respects, they should be 
treated differently. If even an ardent advocate for animals can take that position, opponents could 
easily make use of it as well. 
Another example of differentiation in animal and human thought is captured by Mary Ann Warren, 
who writes that non-human animals cannot change their behavior based on rational thought. Mary Ann 
Warren, Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position, in ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION: THE 
MORAL ISSUES 89–99 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1991). “We cannot negotiate a 
treaty with the feral cats and foxes, requiring them to stop preying on endangered native species in 
return for suitable concessions on our part.” Id. at 95. 
 13. WOLFGANG KOHLER, THE MENTALITY OF APES (1925). Kohler’s publication includes 
photographs of chimpanzees, including one of a chimpanzee named Sultan making a double stick out of 
two separate sticks. Id. at 132. 
 14. In striking deconstruction of Kohler’s experiment, J. M. Coetzee writes a fictional rendition of 
the experiment on Sultan. In Coetzee’s version, the chimpanzee wonders and “thinks” many things 
besides what the researcher is testing as his thought process. He may wonder about the man who used 
to provide food but who now hangs it out of reach. He may wonder about whether the man no longer 
needs the boxes he has put in the chimpanzee’s enclosure. “At every turn Sultan is driven to think the 
less interesting thought. From the purity of speculation (Why do men behave like this?) he is 
relentlessly propelled towards lower, practical, instrumental reason (How does one use this to get 
08__BRYANT.DOC 7/20/2007  9:37 AM 
Winter 2007] SIMILARITY OR DIFFERENCE AS A BASIS FOR JUSTICE 213 
and neither could Goodall as to the chimpanzees she observed. That is 
significant because once it was determined that chimpanzees could make tools, 
humans were no longer defined by reference to their toolmaking, but by 
reference to other cognitive abilities that chimpanzees and other animals had 
not been proved to have, such as self-awareness. Since then captive research 
chimpanzees have been anesthetized, marked, and then given mirrors in order 
to assess whether chimpanzees may have the human trait of “self-awareness,” as 
indicated by the extent to which they recognize the value of mirrors in giving 
them information about their bodies.15 Much more painful and invasive research 
on cognition has been conducted, such as induction of blunt-force trauma to the 
skulls of chimpanzees to investigate the biodynamics of traumatic 
unconsciousness, and dissection of chimpanzees’ facial nerves to measure nerve 
response to a chemical that blocks the taste of sweet substances.16 
The cognitive abilities of many animals, not just chimpanzees, have been 
observed or tested, sometimes in quite painful and invasive procedures.17 Yet, 
despite all this research, the fact of animal consciousness and cognition is 
accepted generally only to the extent of recognition that some animals have 
qualities they were not previously thought to have. This may have enhanced 
sympathy and respect for some animals, but it has not resulted in acceptance of 
 
that?) and thus towards acceptance of himself as primarily an organism with an appetite that needs to 
be satisfied . . . . In his deepest being Sultan is not interested in the banana problem. Only the 
experimenter’s single-minded regimentation forces him to concentrate on it. The question that truly 
occupies him, as it occupies the rat and the cat and every other animal trapped in the hell of the 
laboratory or the zoo, is: Where is home, and how do I get there?” J. M. COETZEE, ELIZABETH 
COSTELLO 73–75 (2003). Coetzee’s deconstruction is important because it shows the limits of research 
into cognitive capacity. In fact, those limitations are exploited by opponents of increased animal 
protection when they claim that research shows only apparent similarity with humans and cannot 
document actual similarity with humans. We cannot know what Sultan, or any other animal, is actually 
thinking. If it could be proved that Sultan is actually thinking “where is home and how do I get there,” 
it would be more difficult to refute the similarity argument. 
 15. Daniel J. Povinelli et al., Chimpanzees Recognize Themselves in Mirrors, 53 ANIMAL 
BEHAVIOR 1083, 1086 (1997). Understanding that an image in a mirror is a reflection of one’s self is 
considered an important indicator of whether an animal has self-awareness. See NICHOLAS WADE, 
Who’s that Strange Monkey in the Mirror?, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at F3. As evidence that the 
animal is actually recognizing that the image is of herself, Dr. Franz de Waal of the Yerkes National 
Primate Research Center notes that female chimpanzees will look at the parts of their bodies they 
cannot usually see: the inside of their mouths and their rear ends. Id.; see also SELF-AWARENESS IN 
ANIMALS AND HUMANS: DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES (Sue Taylor Parker et al. eds., 1994). 
Recent research on elephants suggests that they, too, have self-awareness, as indicated by their use of 
mirrors. See, e.g., Joshua M. Plotnik, Frans B. de Waal, and Diana Reiss, Self-Recognition in an Asian 
Elephant, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17053 (2006), available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/ 
0608062103v1. 
 16. See, e.g., Ayub K. Ommaya et al., Head Injury in the Chimpanzee, Part 1: Biodynamics of 
Traumatic Unconsciousness, 39 J. NEUROSURGERY 152 (1973); G. Hellekant et al., Effects of 
Gymnemic Acid on the Chorda Tympani Proper Nerve Responses to Sweet, Sour, Salty, and Bitter Taste 
Stimuli in the Chimpanzee, 124 ACTA PHYSIOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 399 (1985). 
 17. For summaries of research about the cognitive abilities of animals, see, for example, THE 
COGNITIVE ANIMAL: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMAL COGNITION (Marc 
A. Bekoff et al. eds., 2002); DONALD R. GRIFFIN, ANIMAL MINDS (1992); JACQUES VAUCLAIR, 
ANIMAL COGNITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY (1996); CLIVE 
D.L. WYNNE, ANIMAL COGNITION: THE MENTAL LIVES OF ANIMALS (2001). 
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such animals as similar enough to humans that they should be given the legal 
rights held by human rights-holders at the same level of cognitive capacity.18 
Acceptance of the idea that animals can feel pain and experience emotions 
also lags, despite longstanding anecdotal evidence and observation-based 
research data that have documented intense and complex emotions in animals.19 
Simple observations of animals’ limping after an injury have not been accepted 
as sufficient to prove that animals experience pain.20 Thus, laboratory scientists 
have designed a variety of research protocols to address the question of 
animals’ ability to feel pain.21 Even fish have received attention. For example, 
scientists have found that administering morphine to goldfish hinders the ability 
of goldfish to learn to avoid electric shocks22 and that fish subjected to 
apparently painful stimuli produce biochemical compounds similar to those 
produced by mammals in response to pain.23 
Despite these types of findings, research conducted to determine the extent 
of animals’ capacity to feel pain still leaves room for vigorous debate about 
what animals actually feel when they appear to suffer pain.24 Some argue that 
such research can only suggest what is going on in the minds of animals; it 
cannot prove definitively how the subject animals are cognitively processing 
apparently painful stimuli.25 This is more than a concern about the possibility of 
 
 18. Anstötz, THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 5, at 169–70, 158–72. 
 19. Charles Darwin wrote extensively on the subject, believing that animals have emotions like 
those of humans.  CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS (3d ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1872). However, his views were rejected at the time. Subsequent research 
has revived the issue of emotions in animals. Jane Goodall’s research documented the existence of 
strong emotions in chimpanzees.  Goodall, supra note 1, at 357–87. It has also been documented in 
other animals. JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON & SUSAN MCCARTHY, WHEN ELEPHANTS WEEP: THE 
EMOTIONAL LIVES OF ANIMALS (1995) (elephants); MYRNA M. MILANI, THE BODY LANGUAGE AND 
EMOTION OF DOGS (1986) (dogs); ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH, THE MINDS OF BIRDS (1999) (birds). 
 20. In summarizing the research on animal pain, Temple Grandin describes the act of “pain 
guarding” in which animals will avoid putting weight on injured limbs, stating that “we think insects 
probably don’t feel pain . . . because an insect will continue to walk on a damaged limb.” GRANDIN, 
supra note 11, at 183. Kevin Dolan argues that although some have doubted that animals feel pain, pain 
and suffering are rampant in nature and that doubts about animal pain have been more a matter of 
ignoring the existence of animals’ pain and being indifferent to it.  KEVIN DOLAN, ETHICS, ANIMALS 
AND SCIENCE 155 (Iowa State Univ. Press 1999) (1989). 
 21. See BERNARD E. ROLLIN, THE UNHEEDED CRY: ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS, ANIMAL PAIN, 
AND SCIENCE 114–18 (1998). 
 22. See Lynne U. Sneddon et al., Do Fishes Have Nociceptors: Evidence for the Evolution of a 
Vertebrate Sensory System, 270 BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1115 (2003). 
 23. Michael K. Stoskopf, Pain and Analgesia in Birds, Reptiles, Amphibians, and Fish, 35 
INVESTIGATIVE OPHTHALMOLOGY & VISUAL SCI. 775 (1994). 
 24. See Ricki Lewis, Animal Models of Pain, THE SCIENTIST, Mar. 28, 2005, at S5, available at 
http://www.the-scientist.com/2005/03/28/S10/1#top; see also William Timberlake, The Attribution of 
Suffering, in ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION: THE MORAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 71, 76 (“Both animal 
rights advocates and scientists want to reduce the suffering of others, but this cannot be done in any 
reasonable way until we agree on its nature, extent, and relative value.”). 
 25. Animal welfare advocate Temple Grandin frames it this way: “I think the real question isn’t 
whether or not animals (and birds and fish) feel pain.  It’s pretty obvious they do.  The real question is 
how much does pain hurt?  Does an animal with the same injury as a person feel as bad as a person 
does?  We should be talking about degrees.”  GRANDIN, supra note 11, at 184. Clifford J. Sherry 
criticizes two leading proponents of animal protection, Tom Regan and Peter Singer, for failing to 
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anthropomorphizing animals;26 there is skepticism that scientific research can, at 
this point, fully investigate private, individual processing of experience by 
animals.27 
B. Problems of Application 
Difficulty in proving similarity to humans and subsequent redefinition of 
humans when similarity is found are only two of several serious problems with 
the similarity argument. Use of the similarity argument inevitably creates a 
hierarchy of worthiness based on how closely an animal approximates the 
characteristics of humans, because the similarity argument posits that animals 
deserve protection comparable to that of humans only precisely in relation to 
how closely they approximate humans. Creation of hierarchy, especially by way 
of controlled scientific laboratory research to prove precise degrees of 
similarity, results in problems of line-drawing between and among animals. 
Line-drawing and prioritizing some animals as more worthy of protection 
than others is the likely outcome of the similarity argument because it is 
unlikely that giving some entitlements to some animals, such as great apes, 
 
distinguish between what he calls “sensation, perception, and the experience of pain.” He claims that it 
is unlikely that animals experience pain as do humans (except for great apes and cetacea) because they 
lack the type of brain structures that permit processing of sensations humans process as pain. SHERRY, 
supra note 7, at 32, 38. This is also the view of Bob Bermond. See Bermond, supra note 11. 
This is not just a function of linguistic facility.  Harvard research psychologist Daniel Gilbert has 
noted that it isn’t possible fully to know the experience of humans even when they can express their 
thoughts very clearly. 
How can we tell whether subjective emotional experiences are different or the same?  The 
truth is that we can’t—no more than we can tell whether the yellow experience we have when 
we look at a school bus is the same yellow experience that others have when they look at the 
same school bus. . . . [W]hen all is said and done, the only way to measure precisely the 
similarity of two things is for the person who is doing the measuring to compare them side by 
side—that is to experience them side by side.  And outside of science fiction, no one can 
actually have another person’s experience. 
DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 39 (2006).  
 26. MICHAEL P.T. LEAHY, AGAINST LIBERATION: PUTTING ANIMALS IN PERSPECTIVE (1991). 
Some see overstatement on both sides: activists making animals too human and scientists making 
animals too mechanical. See DEBORAH BLUM, THE MONKEY WARS 264 (1994) (characterizing the 
position of Tom Gordon of the Yerkes Field Station).  Another interesting perspective is that 
“anthropomorphism may not necessarily be false.  The danger lies in assuming too readily that some 
animal attributes can be explained by reference to humans.” ROBERT GARNER, ANIMALS, POLITICS 
AND MORALITY 35 n.1 (1993) (citing S.J. Vicchio) (emphasis added). 
 27. See, e.g., JAMES F. WITTENBERGER, ANIMAL SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 49 (1981) (“We cannot 
assume that animals make conscious decisions because we cannot monitor what goes on inside their 
heads.”); see also Peter Harrison, Animal Pain, in ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION: THE MORAL ISSUES, 
supra note 12, at 128, 129 (“No strict argument can be mounted for or against the existence of animal 
pain. . . . [I]t is the essence of pain that it is a private experience.”); STEPHEN P. STICH, FROM FOLK 
PSYCHOLOGY TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST BELIEF 18 (1983). However, not knowing 
definitively what is going on in the private minds of others does not, by itself, justify causing animals 
pain. See, e.g., Marc Bekoff, Common Sense, Cognitive Ethology and Evolution, in THE GREAT APE 
PROJECT, supra note 3, at 102; Donald Davidson, Rational Animals, in ACTIONS AND EVENTS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DONALD DAVIDSON 473 (1985); GRIFFIN, supra note 17, at 1–
17. 
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would, by itself, break down resistance to giving rights to other animals.28 
Because humans have strong interests in keeping the comparably protected 
community small, humans would not be likely to expand the reference point to 
include great apes for purposes of examining other species to determine their 
similarity to current rights-holders (humans and great apes). Humans would 
most likely continue to use themselves as the exclusive reference point for 
establishing similarity for purposes of the similarity argument. Just as close 
attention to similarities and dissimilarities between great apes and humans 
would be the origin of rights for great apes, each species of animals would have 
to undergo comparison to humans, and each animal species would have to be 
found sufficiently similar to humans that justice would require each species to 
receive comparably protective treatment.29 Advocates for animals may seek to 
restructure society to end and prevent exploitation of animals (for example, 
ending animal flesh-food consumption),30 but use of the similarity argument for 
that purpose is arduous, at best, until the last apparently exploitable, edible 
animal is proved to be similar enough to humans to merit protection. Since, 
despite decades of research, we have not yet proved sufficient similarity 
between humans and great apes—with whom we share the closest evolutionary 
relationship—just how likely is it that we will prove sufficient similarity between 
humans and cows, humans and pigs, humans and sheep, humans and rabbits, 
humans and chickens, or humans and fish? 
In the hierarchy created by the similarity argument, humans would occupy 
the top position in the hierarchy because humans are the standard against which 
other animals are measured. Human-made hierarchies already exist, such as 
 
 28. Theoretically, other animals could become rights-holders as a result of great apes’ first being 
given rights, if great apes were to receive (through their legal representatives) the right to confer rights-
holding status on other animals. Though theoretically possible, it is implausible that apes will receive 
the means by which other animals would be included—voting rights exercised by their human 
representatives. Opponents use the example of giving animals the right to vote to demonstrate the 
absurdity of an animal rights perspective, but, to date, no animal rights advocate appears to have made 
the claim that animals should have the right to vote. In fact, some have expressly stated that the 
entitlements for which they advocate do not include voting rights. See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, 
INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS 101 (2000); Steve F. Sapontzis, Aping Persons—Pro and Con, in 
THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 3, at 269, 274; Peter Singer, Ethics Beyond Species and Beyond 
Instincts: A Response to Richard Posner, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 78, 79; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 3, 11. 
 29. See generally STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL 
RIGHTS (2002) (discussing the possibility of including animals in the protected circle as documentation 
about their abilities and capacities becomes available). 
 30. Consuming animals while professing respect for them is controversial. For example, although 
Peter Singer states that “practically and psychologically it is impossible to be consistent in one’s 
concern for nonhuman animals while continuing to dine on them,” he leaves open the question of 
consuming animals if they are actually humanely raised and killed, stating that only if animals were 
humanely treated before killing them for consumption would we get to that question. SINGER, supra 
note 6, at 164. “Whatever the theoretical possibilities of rearing animals without suffering may be, the 
fact is that the meat available from butchers and supermarkets comes from animals who were not 
treated with any real consideration at all while being reared. So we must ask ourselves, not: Is it ever 
right to eat meat? But: Is it right to eat this meat?” Id. at 165. Another philosopher, Roger Scruton, 
argues that consuming animals demonstrates respect for them. Roger Scruton, A Carnivore’s Credo, 
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, May 2006, at 21. 
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those based on how cute animals are, whether we want to eat them, and 
whether they hold some symbolic value for us (for example, eagles representing 
majesty and snakes representing evil). Those hierarchies, unlike the hierarchy 
generated by the similarity argument, did not result from attempts to help 
animals.  Yet, even though the origins of the similarity argument lie in  an effort 
to help animals, the hierarchy created by its application can cause harm in two 
ways. First, it creates a priority of protection of only certain animals when, in 
fact, all animals exist interdependently and each is important to sustaining the 
web of life in which we all live. Two hypothetical letters written by Richard 
Dawkins in his contribution to The Great Ape Project provide the basis for 
illustrating how the similarity argument creates a hierarchy based on 
prioritizing the protection of animals most similar to humans. 31 In the first 
letter, the writer rejects advocacy for gorillas until the needs of every child have 
been addressed. In the second, the writer rejects advocacy for gorillas until 
every aardvark has been saved. Dawkins contrasts the two letters, noting that 
the first is completely plausible because the oppositional categories of animals 
and humans replicate our society’s belief that animals have less value than 
humans. The second letter is not plausible because both subjects of the second 
letter are animals, and both subjects (not being human) fall into the less valued 
category.  However, advocacy on the basis of similarity would create a 
hierarchical ordering of animals in relation to their similarity to humans. Then it 
would be plausible for a writer to prioritize assistance to one animal species 
(aardvarks) before another (gorillas).32 Yet, while humans are prioritizing one 
animal over another, animals are living in an interdependent world in which all 
animals, regardless of their similarity to humans, need protection.33 
Second, hierarchical ordering of animals based on their similarity to humans 
would increase harm to dissimilar animals by facilitating exploitation of 
dissimilar animals for the benefit of animals deemed to be like humans.34 
 
 31. Richard Dawkins, Gaps in the Mind, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT, supra note 3, at 80, 80–81. 
 32. Since the hierarchy would privilege those deemed closer to humans, Dawkins’ second 
hypothetical letter about gorillas versus aardvarks would probably be written differently to prioritize 
protection of gorillas over aardvarks. Unless science shows us that aardvarks are closer to humans than 
are gorillas as to capacities considered essential to being human, the argument will be that gorillas 
should be fully protected before investing effort in protecting aardvarks. 
 33. I have examined this idea in more detail in Taimie Bryant, Animals Unmodified: Defining 
Animals/Defining Human Obligations to Animals, 70 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 133 (2006). 
 34. Catherine MacKinnon has considered both problems of (1) the similarity argument and (2) 
hierarchy. As to the former, she noted that “seeking animal rights on a ‘like-us’ model of sameness may 
be misconceived, unpersuasive, and counter-productive” because it “misses animals on their own terms, 
just as the same tradition has missed women on theirs.” Catherine A. MacKinnon, Of Mice and Men: A 
Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 263, 264. As to the latter, 
MacKinnon invokes the problem of hierarchical ordering of beings, which, in her view, may be 
especially pernicious when verbiage about love and protection mask domination. Id. at 264–65. 
Prior to MacKinnon’s recent contribution to the debate, a substantial amount of feminist literature 
critiqued giving animals rights, but it was not a critique primarily of the similarity argument. It was an 
argument based on the idea that rights themselves—however justified—create hierarchies that then 
further the opportunity for domination and oppression by those higher up in the hierarchy of rights 
entitlements. See, e.g., Marti Kheel, The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair, in BEYOND ANIMAL 
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Exploitation of animals for the sake of other animals already occurs as, for 
example, when humans feed (and over-feed) their companion animals pet foods 
made from factory-farmed animals. The hierarchy derived from application of 
the similarity argument provides yet another basis for exploitation. If 
entitlements flow from a determination by humans that a species of animal is 
similar to humans, to assure receipt of such entitlements, the law granting rights 
would provide for human representatives to act on the animals’ behalf. If, for 
example, sea lions were found to be sufficiently similar to humans that justice 
required their receiving entitlements, their representatives surely would try to 
safeguard the health of sea lions by securing for them all the fish they need, 
which would most likely mean increasing the production of fish by intensive 
fish-farming.35 Overall consumption of fish would increase, so that no sea lion 
would be undernourished, which occurs now when sea lions must do their own 
fishing. Sea lions—via their human representatives36—would thereby add to the 
exploitation that fish already experience at the hands of humans.37 This assumes 
 
RIGHTS: A FEMINIST CARING ETHIC FOR THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 17, 29 (Josephine Donovan 
& Carol J. Adams eds., 1996) (“The notion of rights can, in fact, be conceived of only within an 
antagonistic or competitive environment.”); see also Deane Curtin, Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care, 
in BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra, at 60, 64 (noting that “the rights approach . . . is inherently 
adversarial”). The claim in this paper is that a hierarchy is created directly through the similarity 
argument and is not necessarily derivative of rights. 
 35. Sea lions are chosen as an example here because sea lions must eat fish to survive. A somewhat 
different example is that of bears, who are omnivorous and like to eat fish. Arguably, if bears were 
deemed sufficiently similar to humans, then their apparent preference to maintain their health by 
eating fish should guide their human representatives’ selection of their diet. So, even if bears could 
manage to survive without eating fish, why shouldn’t they eat fish as they like, as do humans (to whom 
they are similar)?  Likewise, why should sea lions not be able to eat all the fish they want (not limited 
by need to safeguard health) if they are similar enough to humans that justice requires treating them 
like humans (who eat all the fish they want irrespective of health)? 
 36. Perhaps it could be said that giving sea lions entitlements comparable to humans leads to 
humans’ exploitation of fish on behalf of sea lions instead of sea lions themselves exploiting animals. 
However, the point remains that giving sea lions entitlements has resulted in greater exploitation of 
fish, regardless of who is engaging in the exploitation. If sea lions (through their human 
representatives) are not allowed to exploit fish through intensive fish-farming, then they have not been 
given entitlements comparable to humans, who can exploit fish freely. 
 37. Although packaging and advertising claims may lead consumers to believe that farmed fish are 
raised in idyllic circumstances in which they are protected from predators and fed a diet they enjoy (for 
purposes of fattening them for human consumption), in actuality farming of fish most often involves 
raising fish in overcrowded and dirty conditions with heavy dosing of antibiotics as the means of 
controlling the consequences of those conditions. Fish still suffer from various infections and parasitic 
predation. In the course of describing injuries and diseases to which salmon are susceptible in intensive 
fish-farming, Stephen Hume quotes two scientists as follows: 
Everywhere I went near the farms, the fish were covered with sea lice when I took them out of 
the water . . . . Coho smolts were so frantic to escape the sea lice that they were jumping into 
boats. I noticed bleeding at their eyeballs and bleeding at the base of the fins, which are classic 
symptoms of fish disease. I was horrified to see these baby fish being ravaged by these 
parasites . . . . (Quoting Alex Morton) 
Anybody who isn’t moved by the grotesque image of those baby salmon being eaten alive by 
these sea lice—their little eyes popping out because the lice have eaten right through their 
heads . . . well, that person probably can’t be moved. (Quoting Chris Bennett) 
Stephen Hume, Fishing for Answers, in A STAIN UPON THE SEA: WEST COAST SALMON FARMING 24–
25 (2004). 
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that fish had not been granted entitlements at the same time as sea lions, which 
is likely if similarity to humans is the basis for deciding which species shall be 
admitted to the community of those protected by application of the justice 
argument that like entities be treated alike. If the approach to law reform for 
animals is not premised on similarity to humans but is premised instead on 
respect for diversity of life, then sea lions and fish would be equally situated at 
the same point in time. 
If a finding of similarity to humans does not result in entitlement to 
safeguard health as in the previous example, but results only in the entitlement 
not to experience direct, human-caused suffering, then humane exploitation 
that does not cause suffering should be sufficient, and the consumption of 
animals should pass moral muster as long as animals do not suffer as they are 
turned into human-consumption goods.38 But, if animals really are like humans 
as to essential characteristics, why is it just to allow animals only the limited 
entitlement of freedom from human-caused suffering when humans have far 
more extensive entitlements? Why should they not also have rights of self-
actualization? If one responds that animals’ entitlements should be limited 
because they are not exactly like humans, then one has undercut the similarity 
argument altogether: opponents can readily claim that animals and humans are 
not actually so much alike that justice requires treating the two groups alike in 
any respect. 
Those and other rather tedious questions arise because the similarity 
argument is not self-limiting as to what it means to be “treated alike” and 
because application of the similarity argument inevitably creates a hierarchy of 
animals such that it becomes necessary to sort out relative entitlements among 
animals. One wonders if animals would prefer that we spend our time on such 
questions when, after all, the similarity argument does not even provide a 
means for answering the questions it raises. For instance, mere inclusion of 
animals in the moral community does not provide a basis for resolving disputes 
between and among community members about access to increasingly scarce 
resources, such as clean water, air, and habitat, unless one uses the crude 
measure of preferring those animals who approximate humans the most closely. 
If approximation to humans is the basis upon which such disputes would be 
 
Fish suffer injuries and oxygen deprivation due to crowding and poor water quality. Although there 
are various means for killing fish for production, few of them take account of the capacity of fish to 
suffer. For example, most trout farmers use the least expensive method: slow suffocation that results 
from removing the oxygen supply. There are also species-specific torments. For example, according to a 
diver who works for salmon farms that keep salmon crowded into sea cages, salmon suffer if they are 
not killed “before their migratory instinct kicks in.” See Andrew Purvis, Farmed Fish, OBSERVER, May 
11, 2003, at 20, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/foodmonthly/story/0,,951686,00.html; see also, 
Terry McCarthy & Campbell River, Is Fish Farming Safe?, TIME, Nov. 17, 2002, Bonus Section, 
http://www.time.com/time/globalbusiness/printout/0,8816,391523,00.html (describing problems 
associated with aquaculture, which include harms to the environment and harms to wild fish as well as 
harms to intensively farmed fish). 
 38. This may be a basis for distinguishing those advocates who seek only humane use of animals 
and those advocates who seek an end to humans’ use of animals altogether. 
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resolved, the situation would not be very different for animals than it is now: 
without entitlements in resources, animals currently lose in contests with 
humans over those resources because they have no power; with entitlements in 
resources, animals would still lose in contests with humans over those resources 
because their entitlements would receive lower priority than those of humans.39 
Use of the similarity argument also creates tension with one of the goals of 
animal advocacy: freeing animals from exploitative research.40 Whether the 
advocate seeks rights for animals or only more humane treatment, the similarity 
argument requires advocates to use the results of animal-based research in 
order to claim that animals are similar enough to humans to justify the legal 
protection they seek on behalf of animals. Whatever one’s view about whether 
there are risks to animals associated with research based on observations of 
animals in their own habitats, such observation-based research is easily 
challenged when legal entitlements are at stake. Since this society places a 
premium on data from “controlled” laboratory experiments, both advocates 
and opponents will have incentives to use data drawn from research on captive 
animals. If observations of animals apparently reacting to pain by avoidance or 
limping have been insufficient to prove that animals experience pain in the 
same way that humans do, every proposed similarity of animals to humans will 
be subjected to testing through laboratory research.41 
That advocates can cause painful research to be conducted on animals is 
illustrated by advocates’ efforts to ban the production and sale of foie gras in 
California.42 Videotapes of ducks and geese, forcibly fed for the production of 
foie gras, were used to demonstrate the suffering those animals experience, but 
opponents of the ban argued that the images in the videotapes were misleading 
because ducks and geese have esophagi that enable them to withstand force-
feeding without ill effect and that migratory birds gorge themselves naturally 
prior to migration.43 The (literal) picture of cruelty was significantly muddied in 
 
 39. “Similar” animals could receive equal priority if it is possible to increase the resource. For 
example, sea lions could be given equal entitlements to fish if fish-farming could be intensified to meet 
the demands of both humans and sea lions. However, if further intensification is not possible and sea 
lions’ entitlements are inferior to those of humans (because they are less like humans than humans), 
then sea lions will lose in the contest for the scarce resource of fish. 
 40. Harold Guither briefly discusses various positions within the animal protection movement as to 
animal research.  HAROLD D. GUITHER, ANIMAL RIGHTS: HISTORY AND SCOPE OF A RADICAL 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT 16–20 (1998). 
 41. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980–84 (2005). 
 43. Kim Severson, Plagued by Activists, Foie Gras Chef Changes Tune, S.F. CHRON., Sept.17, 2003, 
at A14. Scientists have also been involved in Europe. In response to pressure from other E.U. countries 
that oppose “provid[ing] food or liquid in a manner . . . which may cause unnecessary suffering or 
injury,” the foie gras lobby in France produced the report of a committee of “eminent scientists from 
the National Veterinary School and the State Agricultural Research Institute” claiming that “the birds 
cannot be being cruelly treated because they are neither ill, over-stressed or even over-fed.” Jon 
Henley, France Defies EU to Continue Force-Feeding Birds for Foie Gras, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), 
Sept. 18, 2004, at 17, available at http://groups.google.com/group/AR-News/browse_thread/thread/ 
a14fa01eb073b117/1f8618ee2dcb5c2a?#1f8618ee2dcb5c2a. 
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debate.44 Ultimately, the legislation was enacted when the only producer in 
California withdrew his objections to the legislation in return for (1) legislative 
immunity from a pending lawsuit alleging cruelty and any other such lawsuit for 
the next seven and one-half years,45 and (2) the opportunity to conduct research 
sufficient to prove that foie gras production is not inhumane.46 
Advocates’ participation in a process of argumentation that results in 
invasive, controlled laboratory experimentation on animals is problematic 
because so much research involves considerable deprivation and pain. Also, 
individual animals brought into experimental settings cannot meaningfully 
consent to participate in an experiment for purposes of proving their similarity 
to humans, and their lives are spent (usually quite literally) in the pursuit of an 
idea of “chimpanzeeness” or “goldfishness” or “animalness.”47 They are 
 
 44. Upon hearing testimony presented by both sides as to the cruelty (or not) of forcibly feeding 
birds to enlarge their livers up to ten times their normal size, a legislator commented that the truth was 
hard to discern. “If we listen to these conversations, somebody is not telling the truth.” California State 
Senator Edward Vincent, quoted in Jordan Rau, Activists Win One in Battle Over Pate Foie Gras, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at B1. 
 45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25984(b). 
 46. See id. at § 25984(c).  The language actually reads, “It is the express intent of the Legislature, 
by delaying the operative date . . . to allow a seven and one-half year period for persons or entities . . . 
to modify their business practices.” Id. However, the producer who eventually agreed to the legislation 
and the Governor understood that the ban could be lifted without modification of business practices if 
the producers can show that current methods were not inhumane. See Carolyn Jung, Study Could 
Disrupt Planned Foie Gras Ban, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 27, 2004, at 15A, available at 
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.indian/browse_thread/thread/7feb149559184777/08b9b91b2
842b7a8?#08b9b91b2842b7a8; see also Ali Bay, Activists Unhappy with Foie Gras Law, CAPITAL 
PRESS, Oct. 11, 2004, available at http://groups.google.com/group/AR-News/browse_thread/thread/ 
c3f6f56c2e1224cd/a0ddb78d91df127e?#a0ddb78d91df127e; Mike Dunne, Foie-Gras Ban Isn’t All Bad, 
Supplier Says, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 6, 2004, at F1, available at http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/InfoWeb?p_action=doc&p_docid=105930C70CA0DFED&p_docnum=6&p_queryname=5&
p_product=NewsBank&p_theme=aggregated4&p_nbid=Y6EW59UOMTE2MjM0MjU3NC43Mzk2M
DI6MToxMzoxNTIuMy4xNTAuMTYx; Dave Richardson, Foie Gras Feels the Heat, TIMES HERALD-
RECORD, Oct. 13, 2004, at 6, available at http://groups.google.com/group/AR-News/browse_thread/ 
thread/7983ce3a2e2682b8/e7172985f56825eb?#e7172985f56825eb. 
 47. Feminists interested in animal protection have noted the problem of objectifying animals 
because their work on objectification of women has sensitized them to the perils of objectification 
generally. Objectifying animals, rather than viewing them as individuals, leads to their abuse. As 
Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams have written, “one of the main sources of the continuing 
atrocious abuse of animals by humans is an attitude that allows their reification or objectification.” 
Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adams, Introduction, in ANIMALS AND WOMEN: FEMINIST 
THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS 1, 7 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1995). Such 
objectification happens unwittingly as when, for example, abuse against animals is seen as a warning 
sign of the possibility of domestic violence occurring in a household. The abuse of the animal is, itself, 
also domestic violence in which the animal is a victim, not just a warning signal. See CAROL J. ADAMS, 
NEITHER MAN NOR BEAST: FEMINISM AND THE DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 144–61 (1994). In the context 
of experiments designed to evaluate the abilities of animals, what is valued in the research animals is 
what they will represent on the basis of data collected in the experiment, not who they are as 
individuals with idiosyncratic features. Animals subjected to research are objects known, on some level 
if not all levels, to the researcher as “research subjects” or representative chimpanzees rather than as 
individuals who happen to be chimpanzees. Moreover, their species having been objectified through the 
process of research experimental design and reporting, individual future animals may, but only “may,” 
be protected by way of what is good for the class. Novelist J.M. Coetzee poses the problem by putting it 
into a hypothetical thought process of Sultan, one of the chimpanzees Wolfgang Kohler evaluated as to 
chimpanzee capabilities: “somehow, as [Sultan] inches through this labyrinth of constraint, 
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unwilling participants in the creation of an objectified view of animals; they are 
not willing participants in research for the purpose of finding out about their 
own individuality or the diversity within their species. As the work of Carol J. 
Adams documents as to both women and animals, turning women and animals 
into objects is an integral part of the mindset that leads to their 
commodification and exploitation.48 
Finally, how animals are characterized as similar to humans has significance 
in a society that values certain traits in humans and devalues others.  For 
example, when advocates make the claim that animals are similar to humans as 
to human cognitive abilities, they are at least keying into a value that is desired 
and respected in this society. Entrance to the human community on the basis of 
a quality that is widely valued more readily sets the stage for respect than does 
entrance to the community on the basis of the capacity to suffer. When 
advocates claim that animals are similar to humans as to the capacity to suffer, 
they may at best be stimulating some humans to feel empathy for animals. But 
they also run the risk of provoking disdain, since the capacity to suffer is a 
quality that many see as a source of weakness in themselves or in humans 
generally. Entrance to the human community on that basis is entrance on the 
basis of a quality, which, if used as a definitive characteristic, may well lead 
primarily to pity and advocacy that seeks only the avoidance of animal 
suffering.49 Finally, proving the similarity of animals to humans as to the 
 
manipulation and duplicity, he must realize that on no account dare he give up, for on his shoulders 
rests the responsibility of representing apedom.  The fate of his brothers and sisters may be determined 
by how well he performs.” COETZEE, supra note 14, at 74. 
 48. See generally CAROL J. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT: A FEMINIST-VEGETARIAN 
CRITICAL THEORY (1990) (describing the analogous socio-cultural processes by which both women 
and animals become “absent referents” that promotes turning them into objects for exploitation). 
 49. All one gains from focusing on suffering is more humane exploitation so that animals will not 
suffer, or suffer less, as they are used for human purposes. In order to gain affirmative entitlements for 
animals so that they can lead lives protected from interference, one must make additional arguments 
and not rely exclusively on the capacity of animals to suffer. 
The politics of pity and identity, borne of a focus on suffering, was raised by Elizabeth Spelman in 
her book Fruits of Sorrow, which explores how white women abolitionists of slavery used the suffering 
of enslaved women as a rallying cry for and definer of enslaved women. According to Spelman, an 
advocacy focus on suffering allowed white women to comfort themselves with the thought that, after 
all, they did not have things nearly as bad as enslaved women, and it promoted a flat, uninspiring 
picture of enslaved women who deserved pity but not respect. ELIZABETH SPELMAN, FRUITS OF 
SORROW (1997). 
The potential for suffering and questions of actual suffering have informed the disability rights 
movement, as well. Disability rights advocates are quick to criticize characterization of people with 
disabilities as “suffering a disability” that makes their lives less fulfilling or, even, less worth living. 
Consider, for example, the many negative responses of the disability rights community to the apparent 
message in the movie MILLION DOLLAR BABY that a person with disabilities may be better off dead 
and that it is moral to assist him or her in dying. See Sharon Waxman, Groups Criticize ‘Baby’ for 
Message on Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at E2. Peter Singer also received tremendous criticism 
for comparing the value of life for a human with disabilities and a healthy animal. See HARRIET 
MCBRYDE JOHNSON, TOO LATE TO DIE YOUNG: NEARLY TRUE TALES FROM A LIFE 201–28 (2005). 
Finally, Dick Sobsey suggests that parents who kill their disabled children are treated more leniently 
legally because of a belief that such children were better off dead. See Dick Sobsey, Father’s Day 2000, 
RAGGED EDGE ONLINE (2000), http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/extra/fathersday.htm. 
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capacity to suffer creates incentives to conduct experiments specifically 
designed to induce terrible suffering in animals. For purposes of defining 
animals, that data may swamp research data focusing on other qualities of 
animals such that the primary information we have about animals concerns the 
ways in which they suffer. The symphony of animals’ many wondrous capacities 
will be drowned out by the monotonous single note of their capacity to suffer. 
For all these reasons, particular care is warranted when one invokes the 
capacity to suffer or vulnerability to suffering as a justification for increased 
protection. 
Use of the similarity argument as to single, discrete attributes of animals, 
such as the capacity to suffer, has been rejected by some. Philosopher Mary 
Midgley has argued that neither humans nor nonhumans can be defined by a 
single or even a few characteristics.50 More recently, both James Rachels and 
Martha Nussbaum have written in support of a more sophisticated view of 
animals, which includes respect for animals in accord with their complex 
abilities and ways of living in the world.51 Although much richer and more 
respectful of animals than single-characteristic line-drawing exercises, emphasis 
on complexity conflicts with the similarity argument. 
The similarity argument that justice demands like treatment of like entities 
requires advocates to focus on animals’ similarity to one or a few very specific 
human characteristics that are important to the definition of humans. At first 
glance, it may not seem that the similarity argument forecloses discussion of 
diversity. In the context of the argument that justice requires like entities to be 
treated alike, advocates could (and do) portray humans as so diverse that a 
spectrum of, say, consciousness exists that would include animals at various 
points along the spectrum occupied by humans.52 However, opponents have two 
 
If a person with disabilities is seen as “suffering a disability” or as having enhanced future prospects 
of suffering, the abilities they do have and the joys they do experience can become background music, 
while paternalism and pity may well predominate in the foreground. Yet there is inevitable ideological 
and pragmatic difficulty because of opponents’ demand that advocates demonstrate need sufficient to 
justify increased access. That problem is discussed in the next section. At this point, I note only that this 
is a difficulty that emerges in the context of having to compare supplicants for increased legal 
protection to existing rights-holders and that the choice of suffering as an identity-definer is 
problematic. 
 50. See MARY MIDGLEY, BEAST AND MAN 203–207 (1980) (“What is special about each creature 
is not a single, unique quality but a rich and complex arrangement of powers and qualities, some of 
which it will certainly share with its neighbors.  And the more complex the species, the more true this is.  
To expect a single differentia is absurd.”). 
 51. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice for Nonhuman 
Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 299; James Rachels, Drawing Lines, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, 
supra note 7, at 162. 
 52. Advocates for animals occasionally compare animals to humans who are young or humans who 
are impaired by age or disability. This has been called “the argument from marginal cases.” According 
to one observer of the animal rights movement, this is “probably the most debated [argument] in the 
literature.” GARNER, supra note 26, at 14–16. Perhaps the reason it is so debated is that it is a rendition 
of the similarity argument that spells out and seeks an answer to the uncomfortable question of treating 
animals so badly when they have qualities equal to or superior to the qualities of some humans. For a 
review and consideration of various positions on the argument, see DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, BABIES 
AND BEASTS: THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL CASES (1997). More recently, philosopher Jeff 
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responses at their disposal. They can reply either (1) that there is no spectrum 
for definitional purposes because humans are defined by reference to the 
consciousness of a mentally competent adult human being53 or (2) that there is a 
spectrum but that animals fall clearly outside of it.54 Advocates may try to 
preserve respect for the rich diversity of animal life by supplementing the 
similarity argument with evidence of that diversity. Yet, doing so is 
counterproductive to use of the similarity argument because emphasizing 
diversity undercuts the claim that animals are so like humans that justice 
requires treating them as such. If advocates themselves point to a more complex 
reality, the complexity of the reality can be used by opponents to obfuscate the 
issue of similarity to humans. Moreover, a focus on the similarity of animals to 
humans cannot but devalue the unique meaning that animals, in light of their 
wonderful diversity, bring to the concept of life, because it is only on the basis 
of similarity to specific characteristics of humans, and not on the basis of the 
tremendous diversity of animals at the individual or species level, that animals 
are deemed worthy of protection at all. 
In summary, use of the similarity argument is problematic because, given 
what is at stake, it is extremely difficult for advocates to prove sufficient 
similarity. The similarity argument requires accumulating data from controlled 
research on animals even as advocates deplore research on animal subjects; and, 
despite voluminous evidence of similarity, proof of similarity can as easily lead 
to redefinition of humans as it can lead to redefinition of animals. To define 
animals in relation to human characteristics is not respectful to animals because 
it implies that their worth is measured by reference to how they compare to 
humans, and defining them by reference to the capacity to suffer is particularly 
hazardous to animals. The similarity argument generates a hierarchy for 
prioritizing the protection of animals when, in fact, all animals, including 
humans, need for all animals to be protected in order to sustain the web of life 
on which we all depend. As the sea lion and fish example illustrates, the 
hierarchy created by similarity also allows for privileged animals to join 
privileged humans in exploiting less privileged animals. 
Finally, as long as the similarity argument is in play, the focus of debate 
about the exploitation of animals will remain on the worthiness of animals to be 
 
McMahan takes on this problem of “marginal cases” in the specific context of killing by considering 
factors that affect decisions to actively or passively kill individuals, including animals, humans in 
vegetative states, and anencephalic infants. See JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS 
AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE (2002). 
 53. See GARNER, supra note 26, at 15.  The more difficult case is that of people with permanent 
disabilities as compared to completely healthy, neurotypical animals. Again, the template of a typical 
adult human being may be asserted as the relevant standard, but others have argued that treating 
similarly animals and adults with disabilities in some circumstances is rational. See, e.g., R.G. FREY, 
RIGHTS, KILLING, AND SUFFERING (1983); JOHNSON, supra note 49, at 201–28 (revealing the views of 
Peter Singer in an interview with Johnson); see also DOMBROWSKI, supra note 52; MCMAHAN, supra 
note 52. 
 54. This includes the argument described earlier that animals may appear to think or appear to 
suffer but they are actually not thinking or feeling pain the way humans do. See supra text 
accompanying note 25. 
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protected rather than on what a non-animal-consumptive society would look 
like or how we can get there. Compared to descriptions of animal exploitation 
and the injustice of exploiting animals so like humans, there are relatively few 
discussions and debates about what specific rights animals would have, other 
than not being property, or what an animal-respecting society would actually 
look like. This is not just a function of advocates’ difficulty in stepping far 
enough outside the framework of their society’s extensive use of animals to 
imagine a different societal relationship to animals. If, as a prerequisite to 
change, advocates are preoccupied with proving that animals are like humans, 
that preoccupation will deter and delay the development of concrete, detailed 
strategies for moving our society in the direction of valuing animals for the 
diversity of life they represent and for their unique qualities. 
Since the similarity argument requires advocates to spend so much time 
defending their characterization of animals as “like humans,” advocates may 
not have the opportunity to press the deepest and hardest questions of 
exploiters’ moral entitlement to (ab)use animals. The similarity argument 
places advocates in a defensive posture when they could best serve the interests 
of animals by remaining focused on exploiters’ justifications and rationales. By 
what moral entitlement do exploiters (ab)use animals in specific cases? By this 
question I do not mean philosophical, economic, religious, and legal reasons 
humans give for exploiting animals as a general matter.55 I mean challenging 
both exploiters’ (ab)use of animals and the purported justification for such 
(ab)use in specific instances.  I also mean placing the burden of justification on 
those who wish to harm animals. 
A good example of this type of advocacy is The Paw Project’s sponsorship 
of legislation that challenged the right of humans to declaw their cats for such 
purposes as protecting furniture.56 Declawing is a drastic, extremely painful 
procedure that involves removing the last joint of each of a cat’s toes.57 In 
 
 55. Legally, the explanation is that animals are the private property of humans. See FRANCIONE, 
supra note 8. Other justifications may be philosophical, economic, or religious, such as a belief that God 
made animals for the use of humans. See Aristotle, Animals Are for Our Use, in POLITICAL THEORY 
AND ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 56, 56–58 (arguing that animals by nature are inferior and 
require the governance of humans); St. Augustine, Rational Domination, in POLITICAL THEORY AND 
ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 59, 60 (“[B]y the just appointment of the Creator [animals are] 
subjected to us to kill or keep alive for our own uses . . . .”); St. Thomas Aquinas, Unrestricted 
Dominion, in POLITICAL THEORY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 60, 61 (“Wherefore, as man, 
being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subjected to his 
government.”). 
 56. The Paw Project sponsored legislation to ban declawing at the municipal level and at the state 
level in California.  In 2004, California banned the declawing of wild and exotic cats. West Hollywood’s 
ban was challenged by the California Veterinary Medical Association, which claimed that the city 
lacked legal authority to regulate the veterinary medical profession’s use of veterinary medical 
procedures. The California Superior Court of Los Angeles agreed. Cal. Veterinary Med. Ass’n v. City 
of West Hollywood, No. SCO84799 (L.A. County Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 20, 2005). That decision is now 
pending on appeal.  The record of the appeal is available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=2&doc_id=187811&doc_no=B188723 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
 57. Onychectomy is the veterinary medical term for the procedure in which an animal’s toes are 
amputated at the last joint.  Amputation is necessary because the claw, unlike a human fingernail, is 
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addition to detailed descriptions of the declawing procedure and its effects on 
cats, the Paw Project focused on unique or dissimilar features of cats from 
humans, such as differences between cats and humans as to the function of toes 
in balance, walking, jumping, climbing and running. 58 Due to The Paw Project’s 
advocacy, in 2003 the City of West Hollywood, California, banned declawing of 
cats.59 Whereas previously owners could have their cats declawed without 
justifying their action, declawing is now disallowed unless it is medically 
necessary to preserve the cat’s well-being.60 Thus, the legislative process enabled 
advocates to challenge and defeat common justifications of the declawing 
procedure, which were entirely unrelated to feline welfare, and to shift the 
burden of justifying the procedure to those who formerly had no such burden. 
Advocacy designed to shift the burden of justification to those who formerly 
had no such burden has been developed in other social justice advocacy 
contexts.  When coupled with a vision of justice that requires inclusion of and 
respect for difference, such advocacy presents an alternative to the similarity 
argument.  The next Part considers two additional examples of social justice 
advocacy that used this “anti-discrimination” approach. 
III 
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION APPROACH 
The history of social justice activism in the United States suggests that use of 
the similarity argument during the initial stages of reform may be inevitable.  
Civil rights activists, feminists, gay rights advocates, and the disability rights 
community have all used the argument that a just society would provide 
entitlements to the groups they represent (and the individuals within them) 
because of those groups’ similarity to legally protected groups.61 However, 
despite the intuitive appeal of the argument that a just society would treat like 
entities alike, a model of justice that requires equal treatment only as long as 
there is similarity between pre-existing and would-be rights-holders can have 
strong exclusionary effects. This is true especially if a would-be rights-holder 
has to be similar to pre-existing rights-holders both as to relevant characteristics 
of the pre-existing rights-holders for purposes of entry and as to how the pre-
existing rights-holders act in the settings the would-be rights-holder seeks to 
enter. For example, laws that prohibit race-based discrimination in the sale of 
real property provide only formal equality of access and use, and not real justice 
 
actually connected to the bone and grows out from the bone. For information about the procedure and 
its effects on animals, see The Paw Project, http://www.pawproject.com/html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
 58. I am aware of The Paw Project’s advocacy strategy because, when drafting the legislation with 
Orly Degani and Vicki Steiner, I met and corresponded frequently with Dr. Jennifer Conrad and Dr. 
Jim Jensvold of The Paw Project.  Additionally, I attended a hearing regarding the same proposed 
legislation before the Malibu City Council. 
 59. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL. CODE § 9.49.020 (2000). 
 60. Id. (“No person . . . shall perform . . . an onychectomy . . . on any animal within the city, except 
when necessary for a therapeutic purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
 61. See supra note 4. 
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or equality of access and use, if most people of color are unable to qualify 
financially or if the uses of real estate must comport with exclusively white-
derived standards of nuisance law. Similarly, laws that forbid sex-based 
discrimination in hiring provide only formal equality of access if women seldom 
qualify under male-derived standards of qualification or if they can be fired for 
becoming pregnant. Formal equality based on similarity to white, non-disabled 
men superficially satisfies the basic requirement of a just society that like 
entities be treated alike. Nevertheless, it does not readily admit challenges to 
the relevance of the characteristics used to establish similarity. Nor does it 
readily allow for newcomers, who qualified for entrance on the basis of 
similarity, to reshape the environments they have entered. For instance, in a 
formally equal workplace it would not be unjust to fire an employee who 
becomes pregnant if justice is based on equal treatment of like entities and the 
woman is no longer similar to male workers because of a condition to which 
only women are subject (pregnancy). 
Firing the pregnant employee would not be just under all formulations of 
“equal treatment,” however. In addition to formally equal treatment, equal 
treatment can mean treatment appropriate to allow someone to enter or remain 
in a group, despite inconvenient dissimilarity, as long as doing so is not 
unreasonably burdensome to the group. The aim of “appropriately equal” 
treatment is fairness in outcomes despite dissimilarity. “Appropriately equal” 
treatment is a model of equality based on accommodation because it provides a 
basis for challenging the limits established by formally equal treatment. 
However, both formally equal and appropriately equal treatment rest on the 
similarity argument because both involve assessments of the newcomer’s 
abilities in relation to an existing structure and its occupants. 
Neither formal equality nor appropriate equality requires anticipation and 
accommodation of dissimilar individuals before such individuals have arrived on 
the scene. That is the promise of the anti-discrimination approach. The anti-
discrimination approach requires employers to create a workplace flexible 
enough to accommodate the vagaries of (male and female) employees’ real 
lives, including some (male and female) employees’ temporary absences due to 
such circumstances as pregnancy, illness, or the need to provide care to another. 
Diversity of experience and dissimilar utilization of human environments, such 
as workplaces, is accepted as so natural and inevitable that, before any 
individual would have asked for accommodation, a structure of accommodation 
has been put in place. 
Developing inclusive human environments actually alters the definition of 
what it means to be different. This effect is illustrated by the following 
questions of Disability Studies Professor Rosemarie Garland-Thomson: 
“Would people in wheelchairs be considered disabled . . . if every building had 
ramps rather than stairs? Would attention deficit disorder exist as a diagnosis 
were it not for our demand for a certain kind of attentiveness in the way we 
08__BRYANT.DOC 7/20/2007  9:37 AM 
228 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:207 
structure learning and school?”62 Garland-Thomson is emphasizing the 
importance of context for determining whether a person is different from 
others; a person is not for all purposes and at all times “disabled.” Significantly, 
the consequences of anticipatory accommodation can be beneficial for everyone 
and are not necessarily inconvenient or costly for pre-existing rights-holders. 
There are benefits of including those who are dissimilar, such as the increased 
availability of different points of view that assist in meeting organizational 
challenges. And, if one looks at the concrete effects of an environment that 
supports diversity, not just the value of inclusion of those formerly excluded, 
one can find benefits to pre-existing rights-holders. For example, everyone, not 
just wheelchair users, finds ramps helpful at some times and for some 
purposes.63 
The first type of equality (equal treatment as long as the would-be rights-
holder is similar both as to initial capability and as to use of the settings) has 
been the historical first step of inclusion. Formal equality requires that the 
would-be rights-holder make all the accommodations necessary to function in 
settings that were designed without them in mind; formal equality demands 
assimilation. The second type of equality requires consideration of each would-
be entrant’s capability, regardless of apparent dissimilarity to existing members. 
It reduces the exclusionary effect of formal equality based on the similarity 
argument because an individual can challenge the fairness of exclusion based on 
difference. The second type of equality also requires after-inclusion 
accommodation when newcomers have specific needs that cannot be met by the 
settings in which they live or work, provided that accommodating those specific 
needs does not unreasonably conflict with organizational objectives. It does not 
require assimilation to the degree demanded by formal equality. The third type 
of equality (anticipatory accommodation of dissimilarity so that exclusion is less 
likely) is a relatively new formulation of equality characterized by relatively less 
reliance on the similarity argument, relatively greater anticipation of the 
diversity among members of the community, and some shifting of the burden of 
justification from would-be rights-holders (to justify their inclusion) to would-
be excluders (to justify exclusion). 
The examples to follow illustrate advocacy that shifts from exclusive 
reliance on the first two pathways of equality to tentative emergence of 
advocacy that envisions a restructured society in which the diversity of all 
participants is anticipated and accommodated. These examples suggest 
alternative approaches to the similarity argument that may have application in 
the context of animal protection. That possibility is explored in Part IV.  
 
 62. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Disability Needn’t Be Liability; Conference Reflects New 
Perception of an Opportunity, Not a Problem, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Mar. 3, 2004, at 15A. 
 63. This point was explicitly part of the debate regarding the ADA. See PETER BLANCK ET AL., 
DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 2–31 (2004). 
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A. Feminist Pathways to Justice 
In the 1960s and ‘70s, it was important to women’s advocates to emphasize 
similarities between women and men so that women could gain more equitable 
access to the workforce and the workplace.64 Activists presented women as 
equal to men in worthiness and in their ability to do the same jobs. 
Unfortunately, women’s “ability to do the same job” was understood as 
women’s doing the same job in the same way and under the same circumstances 
as men; in other words, assimilation into the workplace as it currently existed 
was required.65 The argument that women are just like men in all relevant ways 
created downstream problems when women became pregnant, wanted to 
continue working, and found that their employment contracts and workplace 
policies or rules made it impossible for them to do so.66 Women are not just like 
men, and the difficulties experienced by pregnant employees brought that 
reality sharply into focus.67 
At that point, there appeared an ideological fork in the road.  One path led 
down the same similarity-based argument, which would minimize pregnancy as 
a transient and inconsequential difference between men and women. An 
endpoint of this path was the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,68 enacted in 1978, 
which required employers to provide to pregnant women the same kinds of 
accommodations, if any, provided to men who have temporary health 
conditions or impediments to full workforce participation.69 The law predated 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,70 and employers were not required 
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to accommodate any employees’ (male or 
female) disabilities (temporary or permanent).71 The Act required only 
workplace parity between male and female employees similarly situated 
regarding conditions that prevented their optimal participation in the 
workforce.72 An employer still had the power to decide what would be 
acceptable employee performance by reference only to the employer’s 
production goals and the employer’s beliefs about the abilities of optimally 
 
 64. See LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB: MATERNITY POLICY IN THE U.S. WORKPLACE 132–
33 (1993) (describing the “assimilation” approach used by women to gain access to societal 
institutions). 
 65. Regarding assimilation in the context of the women’s movement, see id. at 132–34 (describing 
the assimilation approach); Littleton, supra note 4, at 1292 (describing the symmetrical approach to 
sexual equality). 
 66. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the 
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1123–26 (1986) (describing problems facing pregnant 
women in a male-centered workplace). 
 67. See id. at 1139–40, 1141–42, 1143 (outlining unique problems created by pregnancy in the 
workplace); VOGEL, supra note 64, at 96–97, 136 (discussing the treatment of pregnancy as a disability). 
 68. Publ. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 70. Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). 
 71. See VOGEL, supra note 64, at 95 (stating that the Act never even used the word “disability”). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Finley, supra note 66, at 1141, 1145–46; VOGEL, supra note 64, at 100, 
134–35. 
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functioning employees.73 Accordingly, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
required minimal adaptation on the part of employers, and it furthered an 
ideology of equal treatment that involved placing women “in the same boat” as 
had already been created by the employer for male employees.74 
It is not surprising that emphasis on similarity to male workers and 
minimizing pregnancy by way of labeling it a temporary disability was the legal 
path selected. The argument of women’s similarity to men for all important 
workplace purposes was, after all, the path used to gain entrance to the 
workplace initially.75 However, it troubled some activists to participate in 
identifying a normal life-cycle event such as pregnancy as a “disability.”76 Some 
activists recognized that doing so left in place as “normal” workplaces that 
failed to accommodate all—not just female—employees’ greater or lesser 
capacities during the course of their employment. In other words, it was 
predictable that identifying pregnancy as a disability and arguing that 
disabilities require accommodation would prevent or delay restructuring the 
workplace so that people of differing capacities could work productively 
throughout their years of employment. The moving target of analysis was the 
worker with greater or lesser degrees of (dis)ability; the stationary framework 
of analysis was the workplace as ideally envisioned by the employer. With the 
spotlight on workers’ (in)capacities, it was easy for the discussion to revolve 
around what pregnancy entails in light of what the workplace demands. With 
the spotlight on workers’ (in)capacities, it was not necessary to talk about the 
design of work and work organizations.77 
Equally important to the purposes of this analysis, the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act required a discussion of the biology of disability.78 How is 
pregnancy “disabling,” and how does this “disability” match up with other kinds 
of disability? Who gets “disabled” by pregnancy, and how typical of pregnant 
women is such disability ? Just as activists for animals currently find themselves 
arguing that differences between animals and humans are insignificant for the 
purpose of attaining legal protection, women’s activists found themselves 
arguing that the differences between men and women were insignificant—
 
 73. See Finley, supra note 66, at 1125, 1126–27 (describing the problems facing women in the 
workforce and the lack of accommodation to women’s lives). 
 74. Id. at 1141, 1145–46; VOGEL, supra note 64, at 100, 134–35. 
 75. VOGEL, supra note 64, at 133–34; Finley, supra note 66, at 1142. 
 76. VOGEL, supra note 64, at 94; see generally Finley, supra note 66 (discussing the way men have 
equated pregnancy to disability and how that mindset has caused problems for women). 
 77. Finley, supra note 66, at 1120, 1126–27, 1142–43, 1154–58. 
 78. See Littleton, supra note 4, at 1291–94 (discussing different approaches to sexual equality); see 
also SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
DISABILITY 117 (1996); Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the Sutton Court’s Closeting of 
Disabilities, 43 HOW. L.J. 499, 504–07 (2000) (discussing reliance on medical models of disability 
preceding and during consideration of the ADA, which postdated the PDA of 1978); Mary Crossley, 
The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649–50 (1999) (describing the pernicious 
effect of reliance on a medical model that defines disability as a personal trait of the person who is 
disabled and therefore inferior to those who do not have that trait). 
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regardless of whether they actually suspected that there might be real, 
significant differences. 79 
While the tried and true ideological path was taken as to securing workplace 
accommodation for pregnancy, there was, at least, ideological awareness of 
another path—a path that would involve restructuring the workplace so that 
people of varying capacities at any given time in their careers could work in an 
environment that fully anticipated such variations. Questioning the model of 
equality based on similarity gained momentum in the next phase of advocacy, 
which concerned maternity or family leave. Should an employer have to 
accommodate an employee—male or female—who would not have had the 
need for accommodation had they not taken on the responsibilities of 
parenting? Should women have to choose between family and work; or, should 
the workplace be conceptualized and designed in ways that anticipate 
employees’ having various family-care responsibilities over the course of their 
careers? 
During the late 1980s, feminist activists debated ideology and pragmatic 
strategy in the context of securing for employees family and medical leaves of 
absence that would not jeopardize an employee’s ability to return to the same 
position without loss of seniority or pay.80 Although the Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 199381 (FMLA) fell short of many activists’ goals, at the least it 
furthered a positive concept of the ability of an employee—whether male or 
female—to help family members, of any age, and furthered redefinition of 
employers’ expectations of employees.82 If those ideas were fully developed and 
 
 79. See, e.g., Littleton, supra note 4, at 1291–94 (describing the symmetry approach to sexual 
equality that women were caused to make). 
 80. VOGEL, supra note 64, at 106–10; Littleton, supra note 4, at 1291–98; Christine A. Littleton, 
Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About “Women”?, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 26–31 (1991); Joan 
Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment?  Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 279, 281–84 (1998). 
 81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000). 
 82. The stated purpose of the Family and Medical Leave Act was to “balance the demands of the 
workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to 
promote national interests in preserving family integrity[,]” and to “entitle employees to take 
reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, 
spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.”  Id. § 2601(b)(1)–(2). These purposes were to be 
accomplished “in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers[,] . . . minimizes 
the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex[, and] promote[s] the goal of equal 
employment opportunity for women and men”  Id. § 2601(b)(3)–(5). When the Supreme Court upheld 
the FMLA in 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated that point and wrote further that 
[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a 
lack of domestic responsibilities for men.  Because employers continued to regard the family 
as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or discouraged them 
from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of 
discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, 
and fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their 
value as employees. . . .  By creating an across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all 
eligible employees, Congress sought to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be 
stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female employees, and that 
employers could not evade leave obligations simply by hiring men. 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003). 
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implemented, competitive advantage could no longer lie in preventing 
employees from taking leaves of absence; competitive advantage would have to 
lie in imaginatively creating a work structure with enough flexibility to allow for 
compliance with employees’ right to take care of family members. The focus on 
employees’ assimilating to workplaces defined by their employers shifted, if 
imperfectly and incompletely, in the direction of employers’ structuring the 
workplace in anticipation of employees’ needs. 
Even without complete implementation of the ideology of the FMLA, the 
social value of family taking care of family gained somewhat in comparison to 
the social value of employer autonomy. Both values pre-existed enactment of 
the FMLA, but the relative strength of each changed somewhat as a result of 
the new discourse about and rationale for seeking enactment of the FMLA. 
One significant result of this shift would be that one talks less about the effects 
on employees of parenting or care-taking and more about what work 
organizations look like when employees are temporarily unavailable. For 
example, a discourse about whether employees are deserving of taking leaves of 
absence may well involve discussion about how tiring and emotionally draining 
care-taking responsibilities are and whether a “typical” employee ought to be 
able to handle both work and family-care responsibilities. There would be 
studies of individuals’ capacities to cope with lack of sleep and loss of routines 
to which they are accustomed. By contrast, a discourse premised on the 
expectation that sometimes an employee will be absent for greater or lesser 
amounts of time would involve discussion about organizational objectives and 
strategies and comparative studies of organizations that most competitively 
address this shift in what employers can expect of employees. From FMLA 
advocates’ point of view, the law may not have changed sufficiently to fully 
protect employees who, at one time or another, may need to take leaves of 
absence for medical or family-caretaking purposes.83 Nevertheless, enactment of 
the FMLA shifted the law and legal discourse productively in the direction of 
requiring employers to anticipate their employees’ needs to take leaves of 
absence.84 
 
Nevertheless, there has been sharp criticism of the FMLA, primarily for its failure to require paid 
leave, which, critics argue, leaves stereotypes in place. For criticism of the FMLA’s shortcomings, see 
generally Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values and 
Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2000); 
and Michael Selmi, Is Something Better Than Nothing?: Critical Reflections on Ten Years of the FMLA, 
15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65 (2004). 
 83. See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 82; Selmi, supra note 82 (sharply criticizing the lack of 
mandatory paid leave as the source of continuing disparity in the use of the FMLA provisions and of 
continuing stereotypes of women as caretakers). 
 84. There is disagreement about this point. Vogel notes that discourse shifted during the campaign 
to enact the FMLA, VOGEL, supra note 64, at 108–09, and even FMLA critic Michael Selmi states that 
family leave has received substantially more attention than it had in the past. Selmi, supra note 82, at 
84. However, Selmi criticizes the pursuit of weak legislation (e.g., unpaid family-leave provisions) 
because it could be predicted from the outset that such legislation would not be used as the advocates 
proposed and would predictably contribute to continuity of the stereotype of women as caretakers. 
Although this is the stereotype the legislation purportedly addressed, it would actually perpetuate the 
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B. From Formal Equality to Anti-Discrimination in Disability Rights 
The feminist search for equality in the context of valuing differences 
between and among men and women is ongoing. There is, however, at least 
evidence of a shift from an ideology of equality that is based on how well the 
individual mimics the qualities of insiders to an ideology of equality based on 
envisioning a world in which people with a variety of commitments such as 
work, health, family, and community can participate. Just as the FMLA85 is one 
indicator of that shift, enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
199086 (ADA) suggests that a similar shift has begun concerning participation in 
American society by individuals with disabilities. 
In the disability rights context, the similarity argument arises when disabled 
individuals claim that they are sufficiently like non-disabled people to warrant 
inclusion in human environments from which they have been excluded. For 
instance, when buildings were not constructed with wheelchair accessibility, a 
wheelchair user could not “reasonably” expect to work or to live in such 
buildings, and it was “reasonable” for employers and apartment managers to 
reject applicants who could not enter the buildings in which those applicants 
would work or live. It was difficult to challenge the reasonability of exclusionary 
practices based on the design of workplaces and living spaces because those 
designs seemed inevitable and “natural.” 
Disability rights advocates began to challenge the reasonability of exclusion 
by defining “disability” with more precision. Depending on the definition of 
“disability,” disabled people could seem more or less similar to non-disabled 
people, and it would seem more or less fair to exclude them. Thus, progress for 
people with disabilities first registered as a more concerted effort to define 
“disability.”87 “Disability” as some aspect of an individual that makes him or her 
 
stereotype because women, who lose less money during an unpaid leave than men, would be more 
likely than their husbands to take unpaid leave to care for family members. Id. at 75, 85–86. 
 85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000). 
 86. Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)). 
 87. BLANCK ET AL., supra note 63. The movement to pass the ADA began with a 1986 report 
released by the National Council on the Handicapped (later the Nation Council on Disability). 
TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES – WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, A REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1986). One of the major problems 
confronted by the Council was developing an adequate approach to defining disability. The two 
prevailing notions at the time—the “health conditions approach” and the “work disability approach”—
were both found to be lacking. The health-conditions approach defined disability as any and all 
conditions that interfered with the “normal functional abilities of an individual.” Id. at 2–6. This 
approach was deemed over-inclusive because it encompassed conditions not typically thought of as 
disabling, such as skin conditions. Id. The work-disability approach focused on conditions that prevent 
or limit individuals from working, and it was deemed lacking because individuals with disabilities who 
are working would not be considered disabled, while some people who were not working for reasons 
that had nothing to do with disability would be considered disabled. Therefore, neither approach 
worked satisfactorily to define disability. See id. (describing the inadequacies of both approaches). 
Although an act based on the 1986 Council report was not passed into law at that time, it did become 
the basis for the ADA of 1990. Id. at 2–7. The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102. 
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dissimilar to others, the impact of that dissimilarity on the individual who is 
disabled, and who gets or is disabled for what reasons were all aspects of early 
considerations of what constitutes a “disability.”88 The focus was on individuals 
with disabilities and disabilities per se without reference to how disabilities 
could be a function of the human environment. The fairness of exclusion and 
the desirability of including disabled people were seen as related to the nature 
of the disability and its origin. For example, arguments about whether 
alcoholism or same-sex orientation were “disabilities” revolved around the 
medical basis for those states of being and also around whether individuals 
disabled in these ways deserve accommodation.89 
 
 88. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000). Scotch claims that the passage of the ADA marked shifts in 
conceptual understandings of disability and in approaches to federal disability policy. Until the late 
1960s, disability was “defined in predominantly medical terms as a chronic functional incapacity whose 
consequence was functional limitations assumed to result from physical or mental impairment.” Id. 
That model was largely displaced by the socio-political model, in which “disability is viewed not as a 
physical or mental impairment, but as a social construction shaped by environmental factors, including 
physical characteristics built into the environment, cultural attitudes and social behaviors, and the 
institutionalized rules, procedures, and practices of private entities and public organizations.”  Id.  See 
also Cole, supra note 78, at 504–07 (discussing reliance on medical models of disability preceding and 
during consideration of the ADA, which postdated the PDA of 1978); Crossley, supra note 78, at 649–
50 (describing the pernicious effect of reliance on a medical model that defines disability as a personal 
trait of the person who is disabled and, therefore, inferior to those who do not have that trait); Wendell, 
supra note 78, at 117; DUANE F. STROMAN, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO SELF-DETERMINATION 74 (2003). Stroman notes that the social model 
of disability was central to the independent living movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Although the 
medical model focused on trying to habilitate the individual to fit the environment, the social model 
“emphasizes altering the social and physical environment so that it is less stigmatizing and less 
restrictive.” Id. 
 89. The medical basis for claiming that homosexuality is a disability may have been its original 
classification as a “mental disorder” by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in its Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM).  In 1974, long before the ADA was under consideration, homosexuality 
was no longer listed as a mental disorder, although distress about one’s homosexual orientation 
continued to be listed as such. George Mendelson, Homosexuality and Psychiatric Nosology, 37 AUSTL. 
& N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 678, 681–82 (2003). Mendelson notes that, despite removal of the designation, 
the concept of homosexuality as a disorder remained strong enough that a 1998 article published by the 
APA reported that many countries continue to label homosexuality as a mental disturbance, based on 
the APA’s original classification. Id. at 682. However, the medical basis for disability may also have 
been the result of socio-cultural conflation of homosexuality with a predisposition toward HIV 
infection. 
The APA also listed “alcoholism” as a mental disorder in its first two editions of the DSM. In the 
revised third edition (DSM-III-R), the edition in print when the ADA was under consideration, alcohol 
abuse and dependence were described as including physiological and behavioral symptoms. Alcohol 
Alert, No. 30 PH 359 (Nat’l Inst. On Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Bethesda, MD), Oct. 1995. 
Research continues on the subject of a biological basis for alcohol dependence. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. 
Long et al., Evidence for Genetic Linkage to Alcohol Dependence on Chromosomes 4 and 11 from an 
Autosome-Wide Scan in an American Indian Population, 81 AM. J. OF MED. GENETICS 
(NEUROPSYCHIATRIC GENETICS) 216 (1998). 
Richard Scotch points out that critiques of the ADA have often centered on the moral deservedness 
of the individuals likely to be covered under the law: “Individuals who have conditions which are 
associated with engaging in morally questionable behavior or who are perceived as representing a lack 
of self-control or poor character may be seen as unworthy of public support.”  Scotch, supra note 88, at 
220. Scotch notes that the legislative history of the ADA shows there was considerable “discomfort” 
with the broad and inclusive definition offered by the bill, which included “people with HIV/AIDS, 
alcoholism, most psychiatric conditions, and those with a history of substance abuse.” Id. Such 
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The medical basis for disability and whether justice requires inclusion of 
disabled people was also evident in discussions about other disabilities such as 
vision- or movement-impairment,90 but eventually advocates began to question 
the idea that disabilities can be defined solely by comparing people’s abilities, 
irrespective of the environments those people occupy. Consider, for example, 
two cases of visually impaired individuals.  One person can compensate for her 
visual impairment by wearing glasses, but the other person’s impairment is not 
correctable with glasses. If the first person is not considered disabled but the 
second person is, then the definition of disability is controlled not by the fact of 
visual impairment itself but by whether the visually impaired person can make 
sufficient adjustments to live or work in human environments designed for 
optimally sighted people.91 No adjustment of those environments is necessary if 
a visually impaired person can assimilate successfully (wear glasses); she is not 
disabled as to those environments. However, if a visually impaired person 
cannot assimilate successfully (by wearing glasses, for example), can that person 
be excluded, or should an employer have to design the workplace so that such a 
visually impaired person can work without her visual impairment’s constituting 
an insurmountable hurdle to job performance? If an employer is required to 
anticipate different levels of visual acuity among her employees, her workplace 
will be an environment in which some people who might be visually impaired in 
most settings will not be visually impaired in their workplace. 
Gradually, recognition has grown that a “disability” is at least partially a 
problem and result of human environments designed by those who anticipate 
too narrow a range of occupants.92 The ADA incorporates some elements of 
that recognition and represents some change in the direction of greater 
accessibility. In general, the ADA requires reasonable accommodation of those 
who have not been able to participate in various venues of American society 
but who could do so if reasonable accommodation were provided. The 
reasonable-accommodation requirements of the ADA do not require 
anticipatory accommodation of people with different abilities; they require 
accommodation only if a person can prove that accommodating her disability is 
a reasonable burden to place on those who would exclude her. Thus, although 
the mere fact of dissimilarity cannot operate so as to exclude someone, the 
ADA requires those who seek accommodation to meet a definition of 
 
discomfort also accompanied the passage of the FFHA, as some legislators voiced their aversion to 
protecting “drug abusers and persons with contagious diseases who pose a threat to others.” H.R. Rep. 
No. 100–711, at 82 (1988). 
 90. See Scotch, supra note 88. 
 91. See Cole, supra note 78, at 499–500 (pointing out the fallacy in trying to classify every person as 
either having a disability or not). 
 92. Scotch claims that the passage of the ADA marked shifts in conceptual understandings of 
disability and approaches to federal disability policy from the predominant “medical model” to a socio-
political model in which disability is a construction of the relationship between individuals and their 
environments.  Scotch, supra note 88, at 214. See also STROMAN, supra note 88, at 74 (describing the 
independent-living movement as a time when emphasis was shifted from rehabilitating the person to 
rehabilitating the person’s environment). 
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“disability” without reference to the particular environment they seek to enter 
and to bear the burden of showing that their disabilities can be reasonably 
accommodated. Because of those burdens, the reasonable-accommodation 
provisions of the ADA as originally enacted do not extend as far as some 
disability rights advocates might have preferred, and courts have further limited 
the protective potential of the ADA.93 
Nevertheless, the reasonable-accommodation provisions of the ADA 
constitute an ideological breakthrough; those provisions embed the idea that 
people who seek to enter environments for which they are not naturally well-
suited should no longer bear the entire burden of assimilation or be excluded.94 
“Reasonable accommodation” is a progressive concept in that an employer 
cannot simply turn away a person with disabilities if she can be reasonably 
accommodated. Some burden is displaced from the person with disabilities (to 
make herself compatible with the environment she seeks to enter) and is placed 
on the entity that controls the environment itself. To the extent that some 
disabilities are likely to exist among the pool of applicants for a particular 
position, managers of workplaces have an incentive to anticipate a greater 
range of individuals using the workplace and to design those workplaces 
accordingly, even before such applicants appear.95 
Whereas anticipatory accommodation is a possible result of the reasonable 
accommodations requirements of the ADA, anticipatory accommodation is 
explicitly required by some provisions in the ADA and the Federal Fair 
Housing Act of 1968,96 as amended in 1988.97 The ADA requires new 
commercial construction design to anticipate the probability that commercial 
buildings will be used by individuals with a range of accessibility needs.98 No 
 
 93. Linda Krieger notes that, contrary to media and popular culture constructions of the sweeping 
protection of the ADA, studies conducted in the late 1990s of the Act’s Title I (employment) cases 
have shown that federal courts have been interpreting the ADA in increasingly narrower ways. For 
example, “[a] study of federal district court decisions conducted by the American Bar Association 
reported in 1998 that, in a data set including all published ADA Title I cases that had gone to judgment 
either before or after trial, plaintiffs lost ninety-two percent of the time.  In the Fifth Circuit, the figure 
was a startling ninety-five percent.” Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 1, 7 (2000). See also RUTH O’BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT: GENDER, DISABILITY, AND A 
WORKPLACE ETHIC OF CARE 3 (2005). 
 94. O’BRIEN, supra note 93, at 1–4 (describing the ADA as an ideological turning point in the 
belief that employees should bear all responsibility for fitting into existing workplaces). 
 95. Krieger contends that the ADA represents a conceptual understanding of disability as a result 
of the interaction between “impairment and the surrounding structural and attitudinal environment” 
such that managers of workplaces are charged with anticipating a greater range of individuals using the 
workplace, and not just with including people who were previously excluded. Krieger, supra note 93, at 
14.  This approach (referred to by Scotch, supra note 88, as the socio-political model) presumes that 
environments, not simply individual differences, cause disabilities. Krieger argues that such a 
theoretical conception of disability triggers “a societal obligation to change the environment” to 
accommodate varying levels of ability. Id. (emphasis omitted). See also O’BRIEN, supra note 93, at 4, 
11–12. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2000). 
 97. Pub. L. No. 100–430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). 
 98. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183. 
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individual has to prove that she is disabled and that she is going to use the 
building when it is finished; developers must anticipate that there will be 
differently abled people using the building. Similarly, the FFHA requires new 
multifamily residential construction99 to anticipate the probability that the 
residential building will be used by individuals with varying abilities and 
expectations of using the space.100 No individual has to prove that she is disabled 
or how her disability should be accommodated; the definition of “future 
occupant” of the building has been extended such that builders must anticipate 
a wider variety of potential human occupants.101 
As in the case of reasonable accommodation, the new construction 
requirements only lessen the burden on people with disabilities, they do not 
remove it. New construction requirements mandate only creating the structural 
features (for example, walls strong enough to support grab-bars).102 When it 
comes to actually using the building, an individual may need further reasonable 
accommodation, such as installing grab-bars.103 Moreover, there have been 
various legal battles over the new construction requirements of the ADA and 
the FFHA.104 Nevertheless, there are signs that the ideology of anticipatory 
accommodation is continuing to develop. For example, the “visitability” 
campaign to require all new home construction to have at least one no-step 
entrance and wider doorways is gaining momentum.105 The end result is not 
 
 99. The amendments apply to “the design and construction of covered multifamily dwellings.” 42 
U.S.C. § 3604. 
 100. See id. (prohibiting making residential buildings unavailable because of handicap). 
 101. For an example of the breadth of consideration of these issues,  see Arlene S. Kanter, A Home 
of One’s Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against 
People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925 (1994) (describing how the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988 has been used to protect people with mental disabilities from housing 
discrimination). 
 102. H.R. REP. NO. 101–485 pt. 1, at 116–18 (1990). 
 103. Id. 
 104. These legal problems range from grand-scale issues about the ADA’s lack of enforcement 
mechanisms, BLANCK ET AL., supra note 63, at 2–34, to questions about whether a third story of a 
nightclub qualifies as a “mezzanine” or a “story,” and whether renovations to an already existing 
structure are “alterations” or “new construction.” Laird v. Redwood Trust L.L.C., 392 F.3d 661 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that the third-floor area was small enough to be considered a “mezzanine,” and thus 
not subject to the ADA accessibility requirements of “stories,” and that inaccessible renovations were 
“alterations,” and thus did not require accessibility as long as the services provided there were available 
in other, accessible spaces).  The legal problems that accompanied the passage of the FHAA have run 
the spectrum as well, ranging from litigation aimed at defining the scope of the amendments, Robert L. 
Schonfeld, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, 25 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413  (1998), to clarifying specific building requirements, Baltimore 
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700, 708 (D. Md. 1999). 
 105. This approach to new home design foresees and includes users across a spectrum of ability and 
sizes, and does not conceive of accessibility as a design “problem” only for wheelchair users and people 
with disabilities.  Advocates of the movement assert that design accommodations to achieve visitability, 
such as no-step entrances, wider doorways, fewer interior doors, and larger bathrooms, would be 
inexpensive and easily accomplished. Ragged Edge Online, Visitability: Becoming a National Trend?, 
http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/0103/visitability.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). A federal bill 
requiring that “all newly constructed, federally assisted, single-family houses and town houses to meet 
minimum standards of visitability for persons with disabilities,” is currently being debated in Congress.  
Inclusive Home Design Act, H.R. 1441, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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simply that some people who could not access or use these settings now can; the 
end result is that a broader range of people through a broader range of their 
lifetimes can use these buildings.106 
Similarly, within the design community, the idea of “one-size-fits-all” is 
yielding to the understanding that one size cannot possibility fit all and that it is 
more appropriate to anticipate a range of diverse users of a design.107 Universal 
Design, as it is called, involves anticipating many different kinds of “average” 
users rather than one archetypical “average” user108 and reduces the need for 
people to customize one-size-fits-all designs. Office chair design is an example 
of a shift from designing with an average user in mind to designing chairs that 
anticipate different users by allowing adjustments to chair height, tilt, and 
lumbar support.109 More people can find office chairs that suggest to them that 
they are normal or typical chair users. Most importantly, the prevalence of 
alternative designs itself carries a message of diversity as normal and 
normatively acceptable, even if the purpose of redesigning chairs is only to sell 
more chairs.110 
In summary, both examples of feminist and disability rights advocacy 
involve the following elements: decreasing attention paid to arguments about 
the worthiness of individuals who seek access and protection; increasing focus 
on anticipatory accommodation such that difference is “naturalized;” and 
implicit assumption of the value of inclusion. In the process, equality as a 
function of being similar to those who already have rights or access is gradually 
replaced with equality as a function of structures that are designed to permit or 
even expand the range of participatory possibility to those who had not been 
included, even before and without the demand having been made—anticipatory 
accommodation. Feminist and disability rights advocates are also increasingly 
asking that those who seek to discriminate against others bear the burden of 
justifying that discrimination. Is it possible to use elements of this same path in 
advocacy for animals? 
 
 106. A former opponent of a bill in Georgia that would have increased the new construction 
requirements imposed on developers acknowledged that he did not fully understand the need for this 
type of construction foresight until his father suffered a stroke.  Ragged Edge Online, supra note 105. 
 107. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Foreword to RUTH O’BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT: GENDER, 
DISABILITY, AND A WORKPLACE ETHIC OF CARE, at xiii  (describing the designing trend that 
recognizes the “commercial value of accommodating differences across the range of potential 
customers”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. For the history and politics of chair design, see GALEN CRANZ, THE CHAIR: RETHINKING 
CULTURE, BODY, AND DESIGN (1998). 
 110. See Fineman, supra note 107. 
08__BRYANT.DOC 7/20/2007  9:37 AM 
Winter 2007] SIMILARITY OR DIFFERENCE AS A BASIS FOR JUSTICE 239 
IV 
EXAMPLES OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION APPROACH IN ADVOCACY FOR 
ANIMALS 
Two examples of progress for animals obtained without reliance on the 
similarity argument are the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)111 and the 
development of artificial wildlife corridors. The former protects endangered 
species and their habitats from intentional, human-caused harms. The latter 
enables wild animals to live more safely in areas that have roads because the 
artificial corridors provide pathways above or under those roads. For reasons 
discussed later,112 neither is a flawless example of the anti-discrimination 
approach in action. Nevertheless, both contain the following elements: (1) 
animals are protected without reference to how closely they approximate 
human beings; (2) necessities of life, such as habitat and species preservation, 
are protected; (3) animals’ interests are anticipated and accommodated despite 
costs to humans; and (4) burdens of justification are shifted to some extent to 
those who would harm animals. 
A. The Endangered Species Act 
The ESA is a particularly significant example of seeking reform via the anti-
discrimination approach because protection under the ESA is explicitly 
premised on the value of diversity among animals and plants.113 The purpose of 
the ESA is to conserve endangered or threatened species and their habitats.114 
For that purpose it is not necessary to prove that members of the species think 
or feel like humans, and endangered species are not ordered hierarchically by 
reference to how closely their members resemble humans.115 Moreover, the 
 
 111. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000). 
 112. See infra text at nn.121–37 & 141–42. 
 113. Diversity as a value may, in this case, be tempered by human preferences for some species. 
Although the ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior to protect all endangered species and to 
prioritize only according to the degree to which they are endangered, various critics of the enforcement 
of the Act have found that funding of species recovery programs is heavily skewed toward “charismatic 
megafauna” (chiefly telegenic mammals and birds popular with the American public) and away from 
species with which humans are less readily able to identify, such as reptiles, insects, and crustaceans. 
See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of American 
Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 565 (2003); Andrew Metrick & Martin L. 
Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation, 72 LAND ECON. 1, 11 (1996); Jon 
Welner, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: An Ecosystem Approach to Protecting 
Endangered Species, 47 STAN. L. REV. 319, 335–36 (1995). 
 114. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). See also id. § 1532(6) (defining “endangered species” as “any species which  
is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” other than certain 
excluded insect pests); id. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened species” as any species likely to become 
endangered within the foreseeable future). Although the ESA protects “endangered” species and 
“threatened” species, for purposes of this article, I use only the term “endangered” to refer to both 
groups. 
 115. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)–(c) (establishing no hierarchy for the determination and listing of 
endangered species); id. § 1533(f)(1)(A) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to develop recovery 
plans for threatened or endangered species, giving “priority to those endangered species or threatened 
species, without regard to taxonomic classification, that are most likely to benefit from such plans”). 
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types and number of animal species covered by the ESA are extensive.116 
Invertebrates, as well as vertebrates, are protected; insects, fish, and many living 
beings not commonly known are protected under the ESA.117 Protection of 
look-alike species or sub-species that are not endangered expands the 
protective reach of the ESA; look-alike species can be listed because of the 
possibility of mistakenly “taking” an endangered species when targeting a non-
endangered species.118 
In addition to protecting a wide array of animal and plant species, the ESA 
also protects endangered species’ habitats. By protecting endangered species’ 
habitats, the ESA protects the means by which endangered and non-endangered 
animals living in the same habitats survive.  In that way, ecosystems that would 
have been disrupted by the loss of potentially key members of the system will 
not be disrupted. While look-alike species are protected in relation to 
prohibited “takings” of endangered species, even non-endangered species that 
are dissimilar from endangered species are protected to some extent if they 
share the same habitat with endangered or look-alike species.119 Thus, the ESA 
protects many more animals than might be expected from a law whose title is 
restricted to “endangered” species. 
Habitat is protected by prohibiting direct harm to endangered animals but 
also by requiring permits for development. Developers must receive specific 
authorization to develop land on which endangered species are living, and 
permits will not be issued if development would further threaten an endangered 
 
 116. According to the National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition, as of June 25, 2001, 
there were 1,244 species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA, with another 213 species 
proposed for listing. NESARC Web Page, http://www.nesarc.org/species.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 
2006). For the United States government’s complete, daily-updated lists of animal or plant species 
officially listed as threatened or endangered, see U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Species Information: 
Threatened and Endangered Animals and Plants, http://www.fws.gov/endangered/wildlife.html#Species 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2006). Regarding the ongoing debate over improper political influences, economic 
considerations, favoritism toward certain species, and other similar external factors in the process by 
which the Fish & Wildlife Service lists or delists species, see, for example, J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1466–67 
(2003); Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S. Departments 
of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 278 (1993); Metrick & Weitzman, supra note 113, at 
13–14; Benjamin M. Simon et al., Allocating Scarce Resources for Endangered Species Recovery, 14 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415, 430–32 (1995). 
 117. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(8) (“The term ‘fish or wildlife’ means any member of the animal kingdom, 
including without limitation any mammal, fish, bird (including any migratory, nonmigratory, or 
endangered bird for which protection is also afforded by treaty or other international agreement), 
amphibian, reptile, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod or other invertebrate, and includes any part, 
product, egg, or offspring thereof, or the dead body or parts thereof.”); id. § 1532(14) (“The term 
‘plant’ means any member of the plant kingdom, including seeds, roots and other parts thereof.”). 
 118. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e)(A)–(C). If there is the possibility of confusion between two species, one 
endangered and one not, the one not endangered may be protected for the purpose of protecting the 
endangered species.  Stephen M. Fernandez, Captive-Bred Exceptions: An Unconventional Approach to 
Conservation Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 15 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 163–64 
(2003). 
 119. Although a non-endangered animal could be hunted in the eco-system he shares with 
endangered species, preservation of habitat provides a type of protection the non-endangered animal 
would not have had at all, if he had not lived an eco-system with endangered species. 
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species.120 According to environmental protection scholar Ken Geiser, this 
provision embodies the two primary characteristics of the “precautionary 
principle,” a concept developed in environmental law that requires those who 
might cause environmental harm to (1) refrain from potentially harmful acts, 
even if scientific research has not yet proved the exact nature of the potential 
harm or the degree of risk of harm, and (2) bear the burden of proving that 
potentially harmful acts are sufficiently safe before proceeding.121 The ESA does 
 
 120. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)–(2) (authorizing federal authorities to grant permits to allow incidental 
taking of endangered species as a result of otherwise-lawful activities). Regarding the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service’s habitat conservation plan program requiring land developers to develop plans to 
conserve endangered species habitat prior to obtaining development permits, see generally J.B. Ruhl, 
How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” 
Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999). 
 121. Ken Geiser, Establishing a General Duty of Precaution in Environmental Protection Policies in 
the United States, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, xxi, xxiii (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999). Both 
aspects—the idea of pre-emptive protection before harm occurs and requiring those who would create 
risk to prove that their acts would not be harmful—are attractive.  In fact, more social justice 
movement advocates are exploring the utility of the precautionary principle. For instance, legal scholar 
Anita Bernstein has described developments in sexual-harassment law through the lens of the 
precautionary principle. Anita Bernstein, Precaution and Respect, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & 
THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra, at 148. Steven Wise 
has examined its use in animal advocacy, albeit after animals’ similarity to humans has been 
established. Wise, supra note 7, at 35–38. 
To the extent that the precautionary principle raises doubt about resting decisions on scientific 
evaluations as currently conducted, the precautionary principle could ameliorate one of the pragmatic 
problems with the similarity argument (i.e., that it promotes scientific research to determine with 
certainty whether animals are similar to humans). As it was initially developed in environmental law, 
the precautionary principle requires restraint even without scientific proof of potential harm, as long as 
it is reasonable to suspect that there is risk. The precautionary principle thereby decreases reliance on 
scientific assessments for fear of over-reliance on scientific method and on scientists charged with 
making evaluations. Liz Fisher claims that such fear is partially the result of general misunderstanding 
and ignorance about science. Liz Fisher, Review of The Precautionary Principle in the Twentieth 
Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings, 15 J. ENVTL. L. 104, 104–05 (2003). However, such fear 
may also indicate misgivings about having placed so much authority in a scientific technocracy. Bernard 
D. Goldstein & Russellyn S. Carruth, Implications of the Precautionary Principle for Environmental 
Regulation in the United States: Examples from the Control of Hazardous Pollutants in the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 248–49 (Autumn 2003). Jordan and 
O’Riordan agree that distrust of the scientific method and concerns about the introduction of risky 
technologies, processes, and products have strengthened the appeal of the precautionary principle. 
Andrew Jordan & Timothy O’Riordan, The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental 
Policy and Politics, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra, at 15, 17. 
Despite its apparent value, the concept is controversial. Cass Sunstein, among others, strongly 
criticizes the precautionary principle for its potential to paralyze decisionmaking with uncertainty about 
regulatory inaction or action because the threshold for risk and action is not defined. CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 13–34 (2005). See also Frank 
B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996) 
(discussing how regulations based on the precautionary principle can perversely cause a net detriment 
to public health or the environment by restricting potentially risky products or practices, preventing the 
benefits of their use, and thus producing worse harms than the risks or harms avoided).  Sunstein 
regards the precautionary principle as a “crude way of protecting . . . goals, which should be pursued 
directly.”  Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003, 1005 (2003). The 
claim of uncertainty goes to the definitional problems associated with the precautionary principle. See, 
e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law by Arie 
Trouwborst, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 1016, 1016 (2002) (book review). Yet Jordan and O’Riordan claim that 
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include those concepts as to various permit requirements, but, since animals are 
already listed as endangered before they receive protection under the ESA, the 
precautionary principle would offer more protection if it could be used in ways 
that prevent species from becoming endangered in the first place. 
Despite impressive protections provided by the ESA, the ESA does not 
provide everything that an advocate for animals might seek via the similarity 
argument. Notably, the ESA does not provide protection of individual animals 
or an individual animal’s way of life.122 Members of endangered species can 
spend their entire lives in zoo cages constructed of bars and concrete floors.123 
Certainly, the Act does not protect an animal from research.124 For instance, 
great apes are endangered, but the ESA has not removed the possibility of 
using them for research experiments that benefit humans exclusively.125 Indeed, 
their rarity, as defined by the ESA, provides legal protection only from 
extinction; their similarity to humans may actually have made them preferred 
subjects of experimentation.126 
As for protection at the species level, ESA protection is designed only to 
prevent species extinction, and species’ extinction is considered a problem for 
humans rather than primarily a problem for the animals covered by the Act.127 
 
the primary value and potency of the precautionary principle may well lie in the amorphous state of its 
definition. Jordan & O’Riordan, supra, at 15–16. That amorphous quality might actually be the source 
of its benefit to social justice activists. 
 122. The ESA does provide protections of habitat, but the ESA does not address individual animal’s 
concerns, such as each individual’s utilization of a habitat or an individual’s risk of death, for example. 
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (Secretary of Interior shall designate critical habitat for any species 
designated as threatened or endangered); id. § 1534(a)–(b) (federal officials shall use land-acquisition 
authority or available funds to acquire land for habitat). 
 123. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1) (allowing the Secretary of the Interior to conditionally permit otherwise 
forbidden “takings” of animals “for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the 
affected species”); id. § 1532(19) (“The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”). 
 124. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1) (permitting research on animals under certain circumstances). 
 125. See id. 
 126. Testing Times, ECONOMIST, June 8, 2006, at 81, 82 (“Great apes are man’s closest relatives, 
having parted company from the human family tree only a few million years ago. Hence it can be (and 
is) argued that they are indispensable for certain sorts of research.”). 
Richard Ryder, a leader in the animal protection movement, has argued that “[scientists] cannot 
have it both ways; either men and animals are entirely different, in which case much of their work is 
invalid, or else men and the other animals are rather the same, in which case animals logically deserve 
similar treatment and consideration.” Richard Ryder, Speciesism, in ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION: THE 
MORAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 36–37. 
 127. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (“The Congress finds and declares that . . . these species of fish, 
wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value 
to the Nation and its people . . . .”); id. § 1531(a)(5) (stating that congressional purpose includes “better 
safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation’s heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants.”); H.R. 
Rep. No. 93–412, at 5 (1973) (noting that genetic variations among plants and animals constitute 
potentially valuable resources for addressing human problems such as cancer); Sen. Alan Cranston’s 
remarks on the introduction of the Nature Protection Act, 117 CONG. REC. 560 (1971) (“The various 
species and subspecies are a part of the diversity of nature which we should preserve for the education 
and enjoyment of future generations of man.  Animals are fun to see and to experience.  Our kids ought 
to have the opportunity that our parents had to know and love wildlife and nature.  In addition, 
taxonomists and other specialists within the biological sciences will obviously benefit if we preserve as 
many life forms as possible.”). 
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Animals should be valuable enough to preserve and protect before species 
endangerment occurs. Moreover, to the extent that advocacy rests explicitly on 
human interests and only implicitly on animal interests, such advocacy may 
reinforce social norms of animal protection less directly and fully than advocacy 
that rests explicitly on animal interests.128 According to this argument, in order 
to reinforce social norms of animal protection, one must be explicit that animals 
are the intended beneficiaries of the advocacy. Arguably, the ESA underscores 
the normative expectation that decisions about animals are made with regard to 
human interests in animals rather than underscoring normative expectations of 
animal protection.129 
It seems intuitively correct that advocacy based explicitly on animal 
protection promotes social norms of animal protection more directly than 
advocacy that only implies those norms. The similarity argument explicitly calls 
for protection of animals, and advocacy based on the similarity argument 
promotes social norms of animal protection directly and explicitly. However, it 
is very hard to succeed by way of the similarity argument, and “success” via the 
similarity argument carries significant hazards for animals. Moreover, whereas 
explicit advocacy may most strongly reinforce norms of animal protection, it is 
not true that only actions undertaken explicitly to protect animals can reinforce 
such norms. It is possible that much turns on how developed the norms of 
animal protection are prior to a specific advocacy campaign. If such norms are 
very weak or non-existent, then explicit advocacy may be of greater importance 
in initially building those norms. If the norms are sufficiently strong, then 
enough people will perceive the actual fact of increased animal protection as 
related to those norms, whether or not those norms were explicitly invoked 
during the advocacy process. In such cases, even non-explicit advocacy will 
reinforce norms of animal protection. The ESA, by protecting animals in fact, 
implies that animals are valuable, which in turn reinforces the norm of 
protecting animals, particularly as to that segment of the population that 
perceives the ESA primarily through the lens of protecting animals for their 
own sake. 
B. Artificial Wildlife Corridors 
Another example of advocacy that does not depend on the similarity 
argument is the construction of pathways by which wildlife may safely cross 
under or over busy roadways that divide their ranges. Perhaps the most recent 
 
 128. See, e.g., Donovan & Adams, supra note 47, at 4 (“[M]any efforts on behalf of animals will 
qualitatively improve humans’ living conditions as well. . . . But such an argument reduces an analysis of 
interspecies oppression to a human-centered perspective. Yes, in terms of reducing environmental 
degradation, challenging the mal-distribution of food because of the squandering of food resources in 
the production of ‘meat,’ and preventing human diseases associated with eating animals . . . it is true 
that it is in humans’ interest to be attentive to and to challenge animal exploitation.  But these 
responses concede to an insidious anthropocentrism while trying to dislodge it.”). 
 129. Gary Francione has argued that the ESA is premised only on preserving human values and not 
on protecting animals based on their own inherent value. FRANCIONE, supra note 28, at 183. 
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example is a proposal in Washington to construct an extensive system of 
artificial wildlife pathways to preserve wildlife corridors and wildlife utilization 
of habitat, which have been lost or compromised when roadways cut through 
wildlife habitat.130 This ambitious plan presently includes up to fourteen 
crossings, some of which are large, artificial bridges as wide as 1200 feet, planted 
with dense, native vegetation.131 There will be tunnel crossings for animals less 
likely to use overpasses and fencing to direct wildlife into the crossing areas.132 
Planners considered the desirability of  corridors in order to avoid genetic 
problems resulting from inbreeding within isolated groups of animals, how 
animals will use the corridors, and the need to be patient as animals learn to use 
(or grow up using) the corridors.133 
The Washington plan is notable for its size, but it is not unique in concept.134  
Several smaller systems of artificial corridors already exist. Such systems in the 
Florida everglades allow safe passage for alligators, Florida panthers, 
armadillos, and foxes.135 Artificial corridors outside Barstow, California, benefit 
the desert tortoise,136 and others in southern Montana benefit animals small 
enough to traverse culverts under roadways.137 
 
 130. According to the L.A. Times, although other states have artificial wildlife corridors in place, 
the Washington plan is comparable in scale to the animal-crossing system in Canada’s Banff National 
Park, which is “made of two grass-covered 150-foot wide overpasses and 22 smaller underpasses that 
cross the Trans-Canada Highway.”  Tomas Alex Tizon, Designing a Passing Lane for Wildlife, L.A. 
TIMES, July 24, 2005, at A1, A26. 
 131. Id. at A26. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See, e.g., Blaine Harden, Saving Lives of Moose and Men, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at A01 
(discussing the problem of vehicle collisions with moose in Maine); Kirk Nielsen, Slaughter Alley, 
MIAMI NEW TIMES, June 14, 2001 (on file with author), available at http://www.miaminewt 
imes.com/issues/2001-06-14/metro.html (describing the horror that can result from seeing animals hit by 
motor vehicles); Warren Richey, How Did the Toad Hop Across the Road?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Feb. 25, 1999, at 14 (discussing the corridor in the Florida everglades). 
 135. Tizon, supra note 130, at A1. 
 136. Harden, supra note 134, at A01; Tizon, supra note 130, at A26. 
 137. A scientist at the University of Montana and a for-profit business partnered to develop and 
market the Critter Crawl, which is a metal shelf suspended inside culverts that already run under roads. 
The floor of the shelf is designed for easy, safe footing, and the device includes an internal enclosed 
passageway for smaller animals that might not otherwise use an enclosed walkway also used by their 
predators. Animals’ ability to use the device safely was important to the project, and the device protects 
animals so small that they would not have posed a substantial threat to humans’ safety in the event of 
motorist collisions with animals. However, it is not clear that the Critter Crawl was developed primarily 
due to a concern about animals’ safety. The idea for the invention reportedly arose out of public 
concern about the expansion of a highway in southern Montana, but the highway expansion was taking 
place in wetlands, and public concern might have arisen in the context of concerns about compliance 
with wetlands-impact-mitigation requirements rather than a concern about animals’ safety. Off Beat: 
Professor Protects Critters, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Apr. 10, 2005, at 1M (citing the need to protect 
endangered and threatened species while widening the road); “Critter Crawl” Invention Earns Patent, 
U. Mont. News & Events Calendar, http://news.umt.edu/index.asp?sec=1&too=100&dat=3/17/ 
2005&sta=2&wee=3&eve=8&npa=678 (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (citing public concern over animals’ 
ability to cross a four-lane highway as a reason for a corridor). 
Significant for the utility of this perspective for animals’ advocates, however, is the report that the 
for-profit entity will market the invention more widely than its current use in wetlands.  There are plans 
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To the extent that animals’ advocates were involved in securing these 
pathways, advocates do not seem to have relied on the argument that animals 
suffer horribly as a result of motorist collisions with animals or that the animal 
beneficiaries of the corridors deserve them because animals are like people—
other than perhaps that animals, like people, sometimes need to cross a road to 
get to the other side.138 However, the impact on animals of road construction 
that fails to provide passageways for animals, such as loss of habitat, increased 
exposure to predators, loss of genetic diversity with resultant weakening of 
animals’ physical constitutions, and death due to collision with motorists, do 
seem to have been considered. The end result of including these animal issues 
was redefinition of “road construction.” In praising the Washington plan as a 
progressive and enlightened approach to road construction, Charlie Raines, a 
leader of a coalition in support of the plan, stated, “It’s not the old approach of 
‘We just do concrete.’”139 Road construction had shifted in the direction of 
planners’ anticipating and accommodating the interests of animals as well as the 
interests of humans. 
Research on the efficacy of wildlife corridors to protect wildlife suggests 
that the wildlife corridors do improve animals’ safety, diversity, and access to 
habitat.140 Researchers tend to focus on particular species in particular 
locations,141 but, after reviewing all available published studies on the question 
of artificial habitat connectivity (wildlife corridors), two researchers concluded 
that the benefits are so great that “those who would destroy the last remnants of 
natural connectivity [which is generally more extensive than that constructed by 
humans] should bear the burden of proving that corridor destruction will not 
harm target populations.”142 
Despite the tantalizing prospect of redefining road construction to include 
concern for animal fatalities and a shift in the burden of justification for 
destruction of habitat connectivity, the example of artificial wildlife corridors 
shares some similarities with the Endangered Species Act that make both of 
them less than ideal examples of animal advocacy successes accomplished 
without reliance on the similarity argument. For one thing, no (ab)user of 
animals would be likely to wage a campaign against either project, thereby 
 
to market the Critter Crawl in areas of high population growth and in areas where American Indian 
tribal land is involved because “Native Americans have a high regard for ‘critter’ safety . . . .” Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Tizon, supra note 130, at A26 (citing the possibility of in-breeding or injuries to 
humans as reasons for the corridor); Richey, supra note 134, at 14 (citing the need to protect animal 
and human lives as a reason for the corridor); Harden, supra note 134, at A01 (citing injuries to humans 
as a reason for corridors). 
 139. Tizon, supra note 130, at A26. 
 140. See, e.g., Paul Beier & Reed F. Noss, Do Habitat Corridors Provide Connectivity?, 12 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1241, 1249 (1998); Richard H. Yahner & Carolyn G. Mahan, Depredation of 
Artificial Ground Nests in a Managed, Forested Landscape, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 285, 286–87 
(1996); Do Wildlife Corridors Work? Studying Butterflies and Fragments of Open Landscape, SCI. 
DAILY, June 11, 1999, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1999/06/990611075146.htm. 
 141. See, e.g., Beier & Noss, supra note 140, at 1250–52 (stating that birds are often the focus of 
corridor studies). 
 142. Id. at 1250. 
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increasing the probability that animals’ advocates would end up defending their 
position on the ground that animals are similar enough to humans that they 
deserve consideration and protection.143 As noted earlier, the ESA has not had 
much impact on research or other consumptive uses of animals, and the largest 
consumer of wildlife (hunters) would be unlikely to protest measures that 
reduce road-kill and keep more of their target animals alive. Accordingly, there 
were limited occasions to force on animals’ advocates an argument about the 
deservedness of animals to receive greater protection than they currently 
receive. 
More fundamentally, some might criticize the ESA and wildlife corridor 
construction on grounds that both were last resort efforts to save animals who 
should not have been endangered or experience habitat connectivity problems 
in the first place and that neither significantly advances an ideology of 
protection specific to or focused on animals themselves. The ESA protects 
animals for the benefit of humans who do not want animal species to become 
extinct, and wildlife corridors are justified as reducing motorists’ collisions with 
animals. As noted earlier with regard to the ESA, using a means of helping 
animals that does not require discussion of protecting animals for animals’ sake 
has been criticized as further entrenching beliefs about animals’ lack of 
importance.144 Animals may be beneficiaries, but if they are not consciously 
intended beneficiaries, such developments of which they are unintended 
beneficiaries may not be helpful in setting the stage for future advances. Stated 
differently, the argument is that, while animal protection may result from 
actions undertaken for reasons other than protecting animals, social norms of 
animal protection will not have been reinforced if such norms are not the 
explicit basis of reform. 
On the other hand, approaching a project as though norms of animal 
protection are already fully developed might be an effective way to build what 
are, in fact, relatively undeveloped norms, as long as some normative support 
already exists.145 For instance, building a wildlife corridor may not imply to 
everyone that animals’ lives matter if the explicit reason for the project was to 
reduce motorist/animal collisions. Nevertheless, if it is understood by enough 
people that the corridor was built to protect animals because animals are 
 
 143. This is not to say that neither escaped opposition. The ESA was (and continues to be) opposed 
by defenders of private property rights, claiming unfair and burdensome restrictions on development 
and land use. Wildlife corridor projects are subject to opposition, also, on grounds of costs of 
construction. See, e.g., Tizon, supra note 130, at A26 (quoting Washington State Senate Minority 
Leader Bill Finkbeiner questioning the cost-benefit ratio of the project). 
 144. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 145. Approaching a problem as though it is already a socio-cultural norm to protect animals has 
analogs in that form of psychotherapy known as cognitive behavioral therapy in which patients 
challenge underlying unproductive or irrational beliefs by behaving as though they believed differently, 
that is, in more productive or rational ways, thereby habituating themselves to that different way of 
living and changing their beliefs. See JUDITH S. BECK, COGNITIVE THERAPY: BASICS AND BEYOND 
164 (1995); ARTHUR FREEMAN ET AL., CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE THERAPY 90 (2d ed. 
2004). 
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worthy of protection, then the norm of animal protection may be reinforced 
despite the fact that the project was not expressly initiated primarily for the 
purpose of protecting animals.146 
It is difficult to know definitively whether there is sufficient normative 
support for animal protection such that implicit advocacy would serve to 
reinforce those norms. Arguably there is. Even those who take opposing sides 
on the appropriate advocacy strategy agree that most Americans accept the 
idea that animals can suffer and that it is wrong to inflict pain on a being we 
know will suffer as a result.147 It is tempting to use as evidence the fact that all 
states have enacted anti-cruelty statutes, some as early as the 1880s.148 However, 
the existence of anti-cruelty statutes does not by itself resolve the question 
because the actual language of anti-cruelty statutes suggests that those statutes 
may reflect only the value judgment that it is wrong to engage in individual acts 
of malicious cruelty to animals. Scholars have noted that the anti-cruelty 
statutes are unhelpful in most cases of institutionalized animal (ab)use, which 
constitutes the vast majority of animal (ab)use in this society.149 They point to 
legislative historical materials that suggest that the statutes were not enacted 
primarily for the benefit of animals150 and note that anti-cruelty statutes often 
exempt acts of tormenting and killing animals in such contexts as animal 
research and flesh-food production.151 Thus, there is some question as to what 
norms of animal protection the statutes reflect. 
 
 146. It is possible to engage in “as-if” advocacy while invoking norms of animal protection, of 
course. One could remind those involved of the need to protect animals for their own sakes. In this 
wildlife corridor example, however, it is not clear that there were such explicit statements about 
protecting animals for the sake of the animals themselves. Designing the corridor so that animals would 
more effectively use it could be related to the goal of increasing roadway safety for motorists who risk 
fewer collisions if animals are effectively using the corridor.  Similarly, habitat connectivity for purposes 
of maintaining animals’ genetic diversity could relate more to humans’ interest in maintaining wildlife 
for their own purposes rather than to a concern for protecting animals for their own sake.  News reports 
do not provide clear evidence of the extent of explicit rationales for the wildlife corridor. 
 147. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives, 
in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 69 (“The soft-utilitarian position on animal rights is a moral 
intuition of many Americans.  We realize that animals feel pain, and we think that to inflict pain 
without a reason is bad.”); Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, 
supra note 7, at 108–09 (“There is a profound disparity between what we say we believe about animals, 
and how we actually treat them.  On the one hand, we claim to take animals seriously. . . . On the other 
hand, our actual treatment of animals stands in stark contrast to our proclamations about our regard for 
their moral status.”). 
 148. ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF 
AMERICAN LAWS FROM 1641–1990, 4 (4th ed. 1990); SONIA S. WAISMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 399 (2d ed. 2002); David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-
Cruelty Laws During the 1800’s, DETROIT C. L. REV. 1 (1993), available at 
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arusfavrehistcruelty1993.htm. 
 149. Favre & Tsang, supra note 148; FRANCIONE, supra note 12, at 134–60. 
 150. Favre & Tsang, supra note 148; FRANCIONE, supra note 12, at 135–39. 
 151. FRANCIONE, supra note 12, at 139–56; Favre & Tsang, supra note 148; David J. Wolfson & 
Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American 
Fable, in  ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 205 (considering problems of applying anti-cruelty statutes 
to flesh-food production). 
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This may be a problem of analysis of the literal language of anti-cruelty 
statutes versus what people think the anti-cruelty statutes provide; the 
normative expectation created by the mere existence of anti-cruelty statutes 
may be quite different than the reality of protection afforded by those 
statutes.152 The existence of anti-cruelty statutes attests to the public’s belief that 
animals should be protected from harm and that they are protected from harm, 
regardless of the very real difficulties involved in actually using those statutes to 
protect animals. Thus, there may well be enough normative support for animal 
protection that such norms can be reinforced through advocacy that implies 
normative support for animal protection, without the necessity of engaging in 
explicit debates about why we should accommodate the interests of animals. 
In summary, the examples of the ESA and artificial wildlife corridors are 
representative of an anti-discrimination approach in that they support values of 
diversity and anticipatory accommodation of animals’ interests. These examples 
also illustrate several advantages over arguing for the increased protection of 
animals because of their similarities to humans. Neither starts from an 
ideological position of human superiority that inevitably leads to arguments 
about whether animals are deserving of protection because of their 
approximation to humans. For the purpose of providing protection, neither 
creates a hierarchy of worthiness based on how closely certain animals 
approximate humans. Finally, both are grounded in immediate problem-solving 
that in actual effect spares the lives of animals. In bypassing the justification 
stage and proceeding directly to the problem of saving animals’ lives, the end 
result of the ESA and artificial wildlife corridors is pragmatically useful and 
reinforces norms of animal protection. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The similarity argument that justice requires like treatment of like entities 
underlies most advocacy for animals. It represents the actual beliefs of many 
advocates for animals, and it has longstanding currency in social justice 
activism. The similarity argument influences advocates’ choice of projects, such 
as The Great Ape Project, and it emerges in attempts to pass animal-respecting 
legislation, such as the ban on foie gras production in which it was disputed that 
geese suffer since their esophagi are apparently different from those of humans. 
It is also present in advocacy based on litigation, such as claiming loss of 
 
 152. Legal scholars David Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan contend that even though anti-cruelty 
statutes are not actually useful in addressing cruelty that occurs in the production of flesh-food 
products, “there is still a basic belief on the part of the American public, and legal scholarship, that 
while all may not be right in the way we treat farmed animals, there are laws, albeit imperfect ones, that 
govern the industry.” Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 151 (considering problems of applying anti-
cruelty statutes to flesh-food production). 
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companionship when a companion animal has been wrongfully injured or 
killed.153 
Unfortunately, the similarity argument has several shortcomings. Advocacy 
based on similarity proceeds with great difficulty when differences are obvious. 
Opponents readily reject proffered bases of similarity and find new bases for 
their claims of dissimilarity. Opponents have incentives to prove dissimilarity 
because findings of similarity sufficient to invoke the similarity argument call 
into question moral entitlements to exploit animals. When opponents seek to 
prove dissimilarity or advocates seek to prove similarity to the rigorous degree 
required by their opponents, both use controlled scientific research to prove 
their claims. This conflicts with goals of reducing or eliminating research on 
animals, and it is particularly troubling if the point of comparison under 
experimental research review is animals’ capacity to suffer. For purposes of 
scientific curiosity or human benefit, animals are already subjected to painful 
research procedures. The similarity argument provides an additional reason for 
subjecting animals to such procedures—to prove that animals suffer like 
humans. It is no small ethical problem for animals’ advocates to create 
incentives for such research or to use such research in their advocacy.154 It is all 
the more troubling to stimulate research on animals if, as our knowledge of 
 
 153. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal 
Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47 (2002) (placing the issue of market value 
calculations in the context of general moral and legal valuation of companion animals); Steven M. 
Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of 
Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 34 (1998) (discussing 
different theories for recovery of damages that reflect the actual value of companion animals and 
various theories of recovery). 
The similarity argument operates in this context as a claim that companion animals are sufficiently 
like humans in their relationships with humans that justice requires that harms to animals be valued the 
way harms to humans are valued. Another application of the similarity argument would be the claim 
that companion animals are sufficiently like humans that justice requires that they be compensated for 
actionable harms to their companion humans. 
 154. This ethical problem is not unique to activism for animals. It is an ethical problem as to 
experimentation on humans as well. The shame of the Tuskegee experiments on African American 
men, the testing of polio vaccines on children with disabilities, and Nazi experiments on death camp 
victims are examples of situations in which the question arises of using the research results of unethical 
experiments. Does one stop such research by the demand that it stop, while using the results for other 
purposes? Or, does one remove the incentive to conduct such research by refusing to use results, for 
any purpose, if the underlying research is unethical? See, e.g., JEFFREY KLUGER, SPLENDID SOLUTION: 
JONAS SALK AND THE CONQUEST OF POLIO 167–80, 184–94, 215–19 (2004) (describing the early 
testing of Salk’s polio vaccine, first at the Polk State School for people with mental disabilities and at 
the Watson Home for those disabled by polio, and later at the Industrial Home for Crippled Children, 
before Salk approached the Sewickley Academy, a prep school, for a trial); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, INFORMATION FROM UNETHICAL EXPERIMENTS 3, 5 (AMA 1998), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_5a98.pdf (Recommendation 5 says, “Based on 
both scientific and moral grounds, data obtained from cruel and inhumane experiments, such as, data 
collected from the Nazi experiments and data collected from the Tuskegee Study, should virtually 
never be published or cited.”); Peter Mostow, “Like Building on Top of Auschwitz”: On the Symbolic 
Meaning of Using Data from the Nazi Experiments, and on Non-Use as a Form of Memorial, 10 J.L. & 
RELIGION 403, 403–23 (1993) (arguing that the symbolic value of the non-use of Nazi data outweighs 
any benefits to using the data and generalizing this principle to the non-use of data from other unethical 
studies, specifically the Tuskegee Syphilis Study). 
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humans and animals increases, old questions about similarity are simply 
replaced with new questions about similarity, and if, therefore, fundamental 
questions about similarity are never answered with finality. After all, it is 
unrealistic to expect humans to readily relinquish the oppositional categories of 
“human” and “animal” when humans have defined themselves as “not animal” 
for so long.155 
The similarity argument has other serious flaws. It requires representing 
animals not by reference to their complexity, but by reference to whether they 
have one or a few characteristics considered essential to being human. Thus, the 
ideological basis for justice that like entities be treated alike is disrespectful to 
animals because it requires proof that they are, in essence, humans. The 
wondrous diversity of human and animal life is both muted and mooted by the 
similarity argument, and adopting the standard of “Man is the Measure of All 
Things”156 leads inexorably to the development of a hierarchy of worth and 
access to resources. The similarity argument cannot have a transformative effect 
on society because neither the status quo’s acceptance of “man as the measure” 
nor the hierarchical ordering of access to resources is challenged by the 
similarity argument. 
Having experienced analogous problems associated with the similarity 
argument, advocates in other social justice movements have embarked on 
advocacy premised on a different model of justice. Whatever else may be 
required of a just society, a just society should operate from a basis of respect 
for diversity and inclusion of differently situated entities to the greatest extent 
possible. In fact, a just society would seek ever greater levels of inclusion and 
accommodation of difference, and, in so doing, just practices that require 
inclusion and respect would increasingly “naturalize” difference. This is a core 
aspect of the anti-discrimination approach. 
Part III traced the emergence of the anti-discrimination approach through 
examples from feminist and disability rights advocacy: the Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993157 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990158, 
respectively. Both laws require “anticipatory accommodation” of those whose 
circumstances would previously have been the basis for exclusion. Such 
anticipatory accommodation transforms the very nature of what it means to be 
 
 155. Historian Morris Berman traces the historical path of humans in separating themselves from 
nature and from animals, who are viewed increasingly as “others” and as “resources.” MORRIS 
BERMAN, COMING TO OUR SENSES: BODY AND SPIRIT IN THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF  THE  WEST  
(1998). See generally CARY WOLFE, ANIMAL RITES: AMERICAN CULTURE, THE DISCOURSE OF 
SPECIES, AND POSTHUMANIST THEORY (2003) (discussing humans’ treatment of animals as “others”). 
 156. Two meanings are associated with this statement attributed to Protagoras. One is that man is 
the standard against which all else is measured. The other is that human judgments are idiosyncratically 
related to the particular individual making the judgment. The second interpretation criticizes the extent 
to which people can be objective. Protagoras, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/protagor.htm#SH3b (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). Both meanings are relevant 
in criticizing the similarity argument. 
 157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000). 
 158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
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dissimilar. If a work organization is structured in anticipation of employees 
taking leaves of absence, then an employee who takes a leave is not dissimilar 
from others, and he does not need “special accommodation.” If a building is 
built in anticipation of wheelchair users, then a wheelchair user is not dissimilar 
from others as to access in that building, and he does not need “special 
accommodation” for purposes of access. New differences will emerge if old 
differences fade into the background, but decisions based on the values of 
inclusion and diversity would lead to incremental naturalization of those 
differences as well. Thus, laws based on anticipatory accommodation not only 
support values of inclusion and diversity as to current definitions of 
“difference”; by changing the nature of “difference,” they provide ideological 
support for further applications of those values. 
Both the FMLA and the ADA also place burdens of justification on those 
who were previously entitled to exclude or discriminate on the basis of 
dissimilarity. Previously, employers could require employees to choose between 
continued employment or taking care of medical problems or family caretaking 
responsibilities, and developers could build buildings without regard to 
differently situated occupants. The laws now presume inclusion and 
accommodation unless, under particular circumstances, it is unreasonable to 
expect compliance. Like naturalization of difference, shifting the burden of 
justification to those who would resist practices designed to naturalize 
difference is a core feature of the anti-discrimination approach. 
The examples of the ESA and development of artificial wildlife corridors 
described in Part IV reveal that animal advocacy is not totally lacking in efforts 
to employ aspects of an anti-discrimination approach. Neither advance was 
premised on the argument that animals are similar to humans, and, in fact, 
diversity is affirmatively supported. Both reinforce aspects of what an animal-
respecting society would look like without becoming preoccupied by an effort 
to prove that animals are similar enough to humans so as to justify protection. 
An animal-respecting society would protect animals from extinction, preserve 
animals’ habitats, and provide means for animals to cross roads. Both 
developments also contain aspects of shifting the burden of justification from 
those who would protect animals to those who would harm animals. Developers 
must justify development that could harm endangered species, and, in light of 
documented protection of animals afforded by wildlife corridors, those who 
would interrupt the connectivity of wild animals’ ranges will increasingly bear 
the burden of justifying their failure to construct wildlife corridors. 
Although both examples deal with wildlife, the anti-discrimination approach 
can be applied in other animal contexts as well. For instance, the West 
Hollywood ban on declawing was premised on the belief that an animal-
respecting society would not subject cats to a procedure that involves 
amputating the last bone in each toe as well as severing several integral 
tendons, nerves, and muscles for the sake of protecting furniture. Moreover, the 
law requires that the procedure be justified as medically necessary for the cat 
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before one or more of a cat’s claws can be removed. Factory-farmed animal 
advocacy can be approached this way, too. Opening or facilitating the opening 
of a vegan restaurant is a form of advocacy that is premised on what an animal-
respecting society would look like. As more people discover that vegan food 
can taste good, they will have less psychological need to justify consumption of 
flesh-food, and it will be easier for them to acknowledge that flesh-food 
consumption causes terrible suffering to animals, destroys the environment, and 
results in human health problems. It will seem to increasing numbers of people 
that eating animals is cruel, crude, and selfish. Ultimately, it will be meat-eaters 
rather than vegans who are called upon to justify their food choices. 
The examples of the ESA, artificial corridor development, the West 
Hollywood declaw ban, and advocacy to increase access and receptivity to 
vegan food illustrate an inductive use of the anti-discrimination approach. 
Through specific, limited projects premised on what an animal-respecting 
society would look like, activists can work toward establishing a society about 
which it can eventually be said that animals are respected. How far that idea of 
respect would extend is difficult to predict, since we are only just beginning to 
engage in advocacy based on an anti-discrimination approach. Each project is 
but a building block in support of the idea that animals matter. By contrast, the 
similarity argument most often involves a form of deductive activism in which a 
broad first principle (animals are similar enough to humans as to relevant 
capacities and characteristics to be treated like humans) is the basis for reform. 
Since there is considerable dispute about the starting principle, there are 
significant delays in actually getting to applications of the similarity argument. 
Much could be accomplished for some animals if the similarity argument were 
accepted, but precisely because of the breadth of consequences that flow from 
the similarity argument, it will most likely be rejected. 
The anti-discrimination approach is also distinguishable from the similarity 
argument as to who bears the burden of justification. The similarity argument 
requires advocates to bear the burden of justifying inclusion of animals’ 
interests. Since the similarity argument requires proof of similarity to humans, 
that burden is all the greater because of the tremendous actual diversity of 
animals. Thus, the diversity of animals is a liability under the similarity 
argument. By contrast, diversity is not a liability under the anti-discrimination 
approach. Indeed, it sets the anti-discrimination approach in motion. The anti-
discrimination approach presumes inclusion and requires justification for 
exclusion or discrimination. That burden may be relatively easy to overcome 
initially. However, over time, as values of inclusion and diversity are reinforced 
and developed, it should become more difficult to justify acting in opposition to 
those values. 
The anti-discrimination approach will take time to develop, and the 
similarity argument will not disappear any time soon. The similarity argument 
invokes a familiar concept of justice, and, on a popular level, it creates some 
sympathy for some animals. The similarity argument also arises in response to 
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opponents’ use of dissimilarity arguments. That both the FMLA and the ADA 
continue to bear marks of the similarity argument and the ideology of formal 
equality reveals that achieving change in underlying paradigms is difficult.159 It is 
logical that the same would occur in the animal context as well. As Marc 
Bekoff, a field biologist specializing in animal consciousness, has written, 
On the basis of (a) common sense, (b) findings in cognitive ethology (the study of 
animal thinking, consciousness and mind) and (c) the notion of evolutionary 
continuity, a strong case can be made for admitting great apes into the community of 
equals.  Initially, I was incredulous that such an appeal was even necessary.  Next, I 
found it difficult to conceive that this plea could ever be denied, not only to great apes, 
but to most nonhuman animals.  Considering, however, how many nonhumans are 
used by humans for anthropocentric ends, I came to see that it was my own stance that 
was unusual and in need of justification.160 
It is unfortunate when advocates are drawn into debating exploiters on 
exploiters’ terms. Focus should instead be placed on challenging exploiters’ 
justifications for animal (ab)use and also on providing alternative means of 
accomplishing the goals exploiters claim they can achieve only by way of 
exploiting animals. 
Another reason the similarity argument will continue to affect advocacy is 
that the similarity argument fits with other socio-cultural predispositions in 
ways that the anti-discrimination approach does not. To the extent that the anti-
discrimination approach requires a shifting of the burden of justification or 
incorporates those aspects of the precautionary principle that require restraint 
if there is potential of harm and justification before going forward with 
potentially harmful activities, the anti-discrimination approach conflicts with 
values of minimal interference with business and business innovation.161 Those 
values comport well with placing the burden of justification on the shoulders of 
advocates seeking change, which matches the allocation of burden underlying 
the similarity argument.162 
 
 159. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101, supra note 102; Bornstein, supra note 82 (criticizing the 
shortcomings of the FMLA); Krieger, supra note 93 (criticizing the narrow construction of the ADA); 
Selmi, supra note 82 (pointing out weaknesses in the FMLA). 
 160. Bekoff, supra note 27, at 102. 
 161. According to John Applegate, the precautionary principle does not appear to take root easily 
in places with a “long tradition of scientific corporatism and elitism” or in places where business is 
given extensive latitude to innovate (such as the United States).  John S. Applegate, The Taming of the 
Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 14–15, 20. Nevertheless, its 
influence has been felt in many different contexts. See Bernstein, supra note 121; Geiser, supra note 
121. 
 162. Conversely, changing the burden of justification to those who exploit animals, as part of the 
anti-discrimination approach, may raise concerns about compromising values associated with business 
autonomy and governmental non-interference. Lisa Bornstein notes this problem in the context of 
enacting the FMLA. Bornstein, supra note 82, at 77 (“Historically, governmental action on work and 
family issues, constrained by values of privacy, autonomy, self-sufficiency, and minimal government 
interference, has been limited to piecemeal responses to headline grabbing outrages.”). Jordan and 
O’Riordan consider this to be a problem with the precautionary principle, particularly when it comes to 
reversing the burden of proof. Jordan & O’Riordan, supra note 121, at 28 (“[T]his raises profound 
questions over the degree of freedom to take calculated risks, to innovate, and to compensate for 
possible losses by building in ameliorative measures.”). 
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The anti-discrimination approach holds promise despite the continuing 
existence of the similarity argument. Through conscientious application of the 
anti-discrimination approach, advocates can pursue projects grounded in 
respect for the diversity of animals and their unique characteristics. Holding to 
that course will be difficult because it is easy to be caught in the web of 
similarity and dissimilarity arguments posed by opponents and reinforced by 
the underlying value of free-market capitalism. Even so, the web need not be of 
animals’ advocates’ own making, and it is important to refocus the discourse 
whenever animals’ advocates are called on to justify the changes they seek. By 
contributing to the development of the anti-discrimination approach, advocates 
for animals join other social justice advocates in seeking change based on 
respect for diversity and anticipatory accommodation of all. 
 
In such a socio-cultural environment, it might seem that consumers would have considerable power.  
However, consumers do not have access to information about production methods and about good 
alternatives to products produced through cruel methods. In other words, the “market” works fairly 
well on the side of business, but the “market” does not work well on the side of the consumer as to the 
issue of (ab)use of animals in the production of consumer goods. 
One way for advocates to operate in the context of values of non-interference with business is to 
choose projects that make use of the market. The previous example of vegan restaurants may be 
effective because shaping consumers’ preferences is considered a legitimate market objective. 
However, if competing industries that use animals are powerful enough to create disproportionate and 
debilitating hardships, then advocates’ use of the market would be seriously hampered. For instance, if 
a company is developing methods of product testing that do not use animals but companies that make 
animal-based testing products can control the process by which those non-animal-based methods are 
evaluated, it is possible that the product-testing company that does not use animals would not be 
participating in the market on a level playing field with companies that use animal-based methods of 
testing products. 
